BRADLEY NELSON V. HIBU, INC., No. 18-15330 (9th Cir. 2019)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FEB 26 2019 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT BRADLEY L. NELSON, No. Plaintiff-Appellant, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 18-15330 D.C. No. 4:13-cv-00956-DCB v. MEMORANDUM* HIBU, INC., FKA Yellowbook, Inc., Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona David C. Bury, District Judge, Presiding Submitted February 19, 2019** Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges. Bradley L. Nelson appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his action alleging federal employment claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Am. Tower Corp. v. City of San Diego, 763 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 2014). We affirm. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). The district court properly granted summary judgment on Nelson’s claims arising from his January 27, 2011 and December 6, 2011 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) charges because these claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Scholar v. Pac. Bell, 963 F.2d 264, 266-67 (9th Cir. 1992) (90-day deadline to file a Title VII action “constitutes a statute of limitations” and if plaintiff “fails to file within [the] 90-day period, the action is barred”). We reject as meritless Nelson’s contention that the continuing violations doctrine applies. The district court properly granted summary judgment on Nelson’s disability, age, and sex discrimination claims, as well as Nelson’s retaliation claim, because Nelson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for defendant’s actions were pretextual. See Curley v. City of N. Las Vegas, 772 F.3d 629, 632 (9th Cir. 2014) (burden-shifting framework applies to disability discrimination claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act); Shelley v. Geren, 666 F.3d 599, 606-08 (9th Cir. 2012) (burdenshifting framework applies to age discrimination claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Porter v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 419 F.3d 885, 894 (9th Cir. 2005) (burden-shifting framework applies to Title VII retaliation claims); Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 2002) (burden-shifting framework applies to sex discrimination claims under Title 2 18-15330 VII; circumstantial evidence of pretext must be specific and substantial). The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Nelson’s motion for a discovery continuance because Nelson failed to demonstrate that he suffered any actual and substantial prejudice. See Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A district court is vested with broad discretion to permit or deny discovery, and a decision to deny discovery will not be disturbed except upon the clearest showing that the denial of discovery results in actual and substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). AFFIRMED. 3 18-15330
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
