United States v. Goodall, No. 18-10004 (9th Cir. 2021)
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Facing more than 70 years in prison for his role in multiple armed robberies, Goodall pleaded guilty to two counts of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. 1951(a)) and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)), with a 20-year sentencing recommendation. He waived his right to appeal his conviction or sentence. The court imposed a 14-year sentence. About 18 months later, the Supreme Court (Davis, 2019), held that a conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery cannot be a crime of violence under section 924(c)(3)'s residual clause.
Goodall sought to vacate his conviction and sentence, arguing that Hobbs Act conspiracy is not a “crime of violence” under 924(c)’s “elements clause.” The Ninth Circuit dismissed. Goodall’s appellate waiver foreclosed any challenge based on Davis; the waiver was knowing and voluntary. The “illegal sentence” exception to an appellate waiver does not apply; it does not include illegal convictions. The rationale for the “illegal sentence” exception rests on the inherent uncertainty in sentencing, which does not exist for convictions. Although there always remains a chance the law could change in a defendant’s favor, the defendant knowingly and voluntarily assumes that risk because he receives a presumably favorable deal under existing law.
Court Description: Criminal Law. The panel dismissed, as barred by the appellate waiver in his plea agreement, Eric Goodall’s appeal seeking to vacate his conviction and sentence for brandishing a firearm in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). After Goodall filed his appeal, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), that § 924(c)’s “residual clause” defining a “crime of violence” was unconstitutionally vague. Goodall asserted that his § 924(c) conviction must be vacated because a Hobbs Act conspiracy is not a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)’s “elements clause,” which remains valid post-Davis. The panel held that Goodall’s appellate waiver forecloses any challenge to his conviction because the provision, in which he waived “the right to appeal any . . . aspect of the conviction or sentence,” meets both conditions for enforcement: (1) the text of the broad appellate waiver bars any challenge based on Davis; and (2) the waiver was knowing and voluntary. The panel explained that when a defendant waives his appellate rights, he knows that he is giving up all appeals, no matter what unforeseen events may happen. The panel also held that the “illegal sentence” exception to an appellate waiver does not apply. The panel declined to UNITED STATES V. GOODALL 3 extend United States v. Torres, 828 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2016), which held that an appellate waiver does not apply to an “illegal sentence,” to invalidate an appellate waiver if the conviction was later found to be illegal. The panel wrote that “illegal sentence” has a precise legal meaning, which does not include illegal convictions; and that the rationale for the “illegal sentence” exception rests on the inherent uncertainty in sentencing, which does not exist for convictions. The panel wrote that although there always remains a chance the law could change in a defendant’s favor, the defendant knowingly and voluntarily assumes that risk because he receives a presumably favorable deal under existing law. The panel noted that the practical effect of Goodall’s argument could undo nearly all appellate waivers, yielding perverse consequences.
The court issued a subsequent related opinion or order on December 28, 2021.
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