Epona, LLC v. County of Ventura, No. 17-55472 (9th Cir. 2017)
Annotate this CasePlaintiffs filed suit challenging the County's permitting scheme, which required individuals to obtain a Conditional Use Permit (CUP) to host weddings on their properties. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' First Amendment claim; affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq., claim; vacated the denial of a preliminary injunction; and remanded. The panel applied Kaahumanu v. Hawaii, 682 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2012), and held that plaintiffs functioned as wedding "vendors" because they seek to profit from facilitating and providing a commercial space for weddings; because they are wedding vendors, they may suffer economic injury as a result of the CUP scheme; and an injunction may redress this harm. Therefore, plaintiffs had Article III standing to bring their First Amendment challenge. In regard to the First Amendment claim, the permitting scheme was unconstitutional because it lacked definite and objective standards and lacked a time limit. In regard to the RLUIPA equal treatment claim, the panel held that plaintiffs did not assert that they were a religious institution or assembly.
Court Description: Civil Rights. The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal of appellants’ First Amendment claim, affirmed the dismissal of appellants’ Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act claim, vacated the denial of a preliminary injunction and remanded in an action challenging the County of Ventura’s permitting scheme, which requires individuals to obtain a Conditional Use Permit to host weddings on their properties. Applying Kaahumanu v. Hawaii, 682 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2012), the panel first held that appellants functioned as wedding “vendors” because they sought to profit from facilitating and providing a commercial space for weddings. The panel held that because they were wedding vendors, they may suffer economic injury as a result of the permitting scheme, and an injunction may redress this harm. Thus, the panel held that appellants had Article III standing to bring their First Amendment challenge. The panel reversed the dismissal of appellants’ First Amendment claim, holding that the permitting scheme lacked definite and objective standards and also failed to provide any limitation on the time period within which a permit must be approved. Together, these defects conferred unbridled discretion on permitting officials. The panel affirmed the dismissal of appellants’ equal treatment claim
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