USA V. JAMES PRATT, No. 17-35887 (9th Cir. 2019)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION SEP 26 2019 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS No. 17-35887 D.C. No. 1:16-cv-00108-DCN v. MEMORANDUM* JAMES A. PRATT, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Idaho David C. Nye, District Judge, Presiding Submitted September 18, 2019** Before: FARRIS, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges. James A. Pratt appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in this foreclosure action brought by the United States to enforce liens on Pratt’s property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Berezovsky v. Moniz, 869 F.3d 923, 927 (9th Cir. 2017), and we affirm. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the United States because Pratt failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the Farm Service Agency owned the debt secured by a deed of trust on Pratt’s property and whether Pratt was in default on that debt. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”); United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726-729 (1979) (explaining that “federal law governs questions involving the rights of the United States arising under nationwide federal programs,” but state law provides the content where a national rule is unnecessary to protect federal interest); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n N.D. v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 337 P.3d 605, 610 (Idaho 2014) (Idaho foreclosure requirements for a loan secured by a deed of trust). The district court judge did not plainly err in declining to recuse himself sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 455 because Pratt failed to demonstrate any grounds for recusal. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (listing circumstances requiring recusal); United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 911-13 (9th Cir. 2008) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that § 455 “asks whether a reasonable person perceives a significant risk that the judge will resolve the case on a basis other than the merits;” “the reasonable person is not someone who is hypersensitive or unduly suspicious, but rather is a well-informed, thoughtful observer” (citation and 2 17-35887 internal quotation marks omitted)). We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). All pending motions are denied. AFFIRMED. 3 17-35887
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
