Rynearson v. Ferguson, No. 17-35853 (9th Cir. 2018)
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In the circumstances of this case, the Ninth Circuit held that federal courts should not abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a constitutional challenge to a state criminal statute while there are ongoing state court protection order proceedings arguably related to a challenge to the criminal statute. While plaintiff was the respondent in a Washington state court temporary stalking protection order proceeding, he filed a federal action seeking to enjoin enforcement of Washington's cyberstalking statute.
The panel held that the Washington state stalking protection order proceedings against plaintiff did not fit into the narrow category of state cases in which federal abstention was appropriate under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The panel reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint, because the state protection proceedings did not present the exceptional circumstances that warranted abstention. Therefore, the panel remanded for further proceedings.
Court Description: Civil Rights. The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal, on abstention grounds, of plaintiff’s complaint seeking to enjoin enforcement of Washington’s cyberstalking law and to obtain a declaratory judgment that the law is unconstitutional. Plaintiff was the respondent in a Washington state court protection order proceeding filed by a person who lived near plaintiff and who was the subject of plaintiff’s multiple online postings. Based on the allegations of stalking, cyberstalking and harassment, the state court entered a temporary stalking protection order against plaintiff. While the state court proceedings were pending, plaintiff filed a federal action which sought to enjoin enforcement of Washington’s cyberstalking statute, Wash. Rev. Code § 9.61.260(1)(b). The panel held that the Washington state stalking protection order proceedings against plaintiff did not fit into the narrow category of state cases in which federal abstention was appropriate under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The state proceedings were not quasi-criminal enforcement actions and did not involve the state’s interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts. Additionally, the panel held that Younger was not appropriate because plaintiff’s federal constitutional challenge to the cyberstalking statute would not have the practical effect of enjoining the state proceedings. The panel noted that the RYNEARSON V. FERGUSON 3 state court protection order was not based solely on the crime of cyberstalking, but also on a finding that plaintiff had committed stalking and unlawful harassment. Therefore, the declaratory judgment and injunction that plaintiff sought in the federal proceedings would not have prevented the municipal court from issuing a stalking protection order. The panel further concluded that the stalking protection orders issued by the state court and the cyberstalking statute covered different conduct and that even if the state were enjoined from enforcing the criminal cyberstalking law, plaintiff could still have been charged with violating the protection order. The panel remanded for further proceedings.
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