DANTE TAPLIN V. MULTNOMAH COUNTY HEALTH SVCS, No. 17-35842 (9th Cir. 2018)
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED AUG 21 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT DANTE LAMON TAPLIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS No. 17-35842 D.C. No. 3:15-cv-01937-AA v. MEMORANDUM* MULTNOMAH COUNTY HEALTH SERVICES; et al., Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Ann L. Aiken, District Judge, Presiding Submitted August 15, 2018** Before: FARRIS, BYBEE, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges. Dante Lamon Taplin appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs during his pretrial detention at Multnomah County Inverness Jail. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Toguchi * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant Ersson because, under any potentially applicable standard, Taplin failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Ersson knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Taplin’s ankle fracture. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (in considering the conditions of pretrial detention, courts consider whether the conditions amount to punishment); Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057-58 (neither a difference of opinion concerning the course of treatment nor mere negligence in treating a medical condition amounts to deliberate indifference); see also Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2018) (elements of Fourteenth Amendment medical care claim by pretrial detainee). The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants Multnomah County Sheriff’s Office and Multnomah County Health Services because Taplin failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether a policy or custom caused him to suffer constitutional injuries. See Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1073-76 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (discussing requirements to establish municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Taplin’s motions for appointment of counsel because Taplin failed to demonstrate exceptional 2 17-35842 circumstances. See Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting forth standard of review and requirements for appointment of counsel). We reject as unsupported by the record Taplin’s contention that the district court improperly granted summary judgment without allowing an opportunity for discovery. We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). AFFIRMED. 3 17-35842
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