CHAD ROMINE V. GEOFF DUPPMAN, No. 17-17142 (9th Cir. 2018)

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED AUG 21 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT CHAD JAMES ROMINE, No. Plaintiff-Appellant, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 17-17142 D.C. No. 2:16-cv-02012-TLN-EFB v. MEMORANDUM* GEOFF DUPPMAN; et al., Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Troy L. Nunley, District Judge, Presiding Submitted August 15, 2018** Before: FARRIS, BYBEE, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges. Chad James Romine appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims arising from a dispute regarding car repair services. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Romine’s request for oral argument, set forth in his reply brief, is denied. review de novo a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 889 F.3d 956, 963 (9th Cir. 2018). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record, Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm. Dismissal of Romine’s federal claims was proper because Romine failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim for relief. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 557 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth elements of a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act); Lindsey v. SLT L.A., LLC, 447 F.3d 1138, 1144-45 (9th Cir. 2006) (setting forth elements of a claim under 42 U.S.C § 1981); Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992) (setting forth elements of a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)); Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991) (setting forth elements of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and 2 17-17142 stating that “[a]lthough leave to amend should be given freely, a district court may dismiss without leave where a plaintiff’s proposed amendments would fail to cure the pleading deficiencies and amendment would be futile”). We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). AFFIRMED. 3 17-17142

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.