Solorio-Ruiz v. Sessions, No. 16-73085 (9th Cir. 2018)
Annotate this CaseA California conviction for carjacking under Penal Code section 215(a) does not qualify as a crime of violence. The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review of a final order of removal. The panel held that Nieves-Medrano v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2010), which held that a conviction for carjacking under section 215 is categorically a crime of violence under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), cannot stand in light of Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010), which held that the physical force that a crime of violence entails must be violent force. Because section 215 did not require the use of violent force that Johnson required, the California statute was not a crime of violence. The panel remanded for further proceedings.
Court Description: Immigration. The panel granted Roberto Solorio-Ruiz’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision, holding that his conviction for carjacking under California Penal Code § 215(a) is not a crime of violence aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) that made him ineligible for relief from removal, and remanded for the agency to determine whether the conviction is a theft offense aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G). The panel held that Nieves-Medrano v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2010), which squarely held that a conviction for carjacking under California Penal Code § 215 is categorically a crime of violence under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), cannot stand in light of Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010), which held that the physical force that a crime of violence entails must be “violent force—that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.” Examining California case law, the panel concluded that, because the California carjacking statute does not require the violent force that Johnson demands, the statute is not a crime of violence. Because the Board did not consider the immigration judge’s alternate holding that Solorio-Ruiz’s carjacking conviction qualifies as a theft offense aggravated felony SOLORIO-RUIZ V. SESSIONS 3 under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), the panel remanded for the Board to consider that issue in the first instance.
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