Tomczyk v. Garland, No. 16-72926 (9th Cir. 2021)
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The en banc court held that an individual's inadmissible status renders that individual's reentry illegal for purposes of reinstatement of a prior removal order under 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5), regardless of the individual's manner of reentry. The en banc court reaffirmed the holdings of two of its prior published opinions, which are in turn consistent with the interpretation of 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5) adopted by the two other circuits to have squarely addressed this issue. In this case, petitioner was a noncitizen subject to a previous removal order who illegally reentered the United States, and thus DHS did not err in reinstating his removal order.
The en banc court found petitioner's contention, that the reinstatement of the removal order violates due process because it interferes with his right to remain in the United States with his wife, lacking in merit. The en banc court further concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioner's contention that insufficient evidence supported his original removal order. Accordingly, the en banc court denied in part and dismissed in part the petition for review.
Court Description: Immigration. Denying in part and dismissing in part Gary Tomczyk’s petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision, the en banc court held that an individual’s inadmissible status renders that individual’s reentry illegal for purposes of reinstatement of a prior removal order under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), regardless of the individual’s manner of reentry. Tomczyk, a citizen of Canada, was deported in July 1990. He reentered in July 1991 after he was waved into the country by an immigration official. More than 25 years later, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) reinstated his prior order under § 1231(a)(5), which only requires proof that (1) petitioner is an alien, (2) who was subject to a prior removal order, and (3) who “reentered the United States illegally.” A divided three-judge panel of this court granted Tomczyk’s petition for review, holding that his reentry was not illegal because he was purportedly waved into the country, and that a noncitizen’s status of inadmissibility, standing alone, was insufficient to render the reentry illegal. The en banc court concluded that DHS did not err in reinstating Tomczyk’s removal order. Observing that the Immigration and Nationality Act does not define the phrase, “reentered the United States illegally,” the en banc court looked to the language’s ordinary meaning. Applying the ordinary and commonly understood meaning of “illegal,” as TOMCZYK V. GARLAND 3 reflected in dictionary definitions, the en banc court concluded that a noncitizen reenters “illegally” when the noncitizen is forbidden by law from gaining admission into the country. Addressing whether Tomczyk was legally permitted to reenter in July 1991, the en banc court explained that he had been deported in part under a drug-related ground of inadmissibility and there was no indication that he had obtained a waiver of inadmissibility. Nor did Tomczyk cite any authority suggesting that the manner of his reentry effected a waiver. Because the law forbade Tomczyk from gaining admission in July 1991, the en banc court concluded that his reentry while inadmissible was illegal as a matter of law. The en banc court observed that its conclusion is consistent with the court’s precedent, which in turn is consistent with the interpretations of the two other circuits to have addressed this question. Tomczyk next argued that the government should be estopped from claiming that he reentered illegally because the government had given him a notice at the time of his deportation, which stated that, if he desired to reenter within one year, he would have to request permission to reapply for admission and stated that reentry within a year without permission would subject him to prosecution. Tomczyk claimed that he chose to wait more than a year before reentering because he interpreted this notice to mean that he would then be free to reenter. The en banc court rejected his argument, observing that the record contained no indication that the government engaged in any misconduct and that neither the issuance of the notice nor the border official’s decision to wave Tomczyk into the country deprived him of any rights to which he otherwise would have been entitled. 4 TOMCZYK V. GARLAND Tomczyk also contended that § 1231(a)(5) could not be applied retroactively against him. The en banc court rejected this argument, explaining that Tomczyk had no pending application when the law came into effect and that merely being eligible to apply for relief in the future was insufficient. Finally, the en banc court rejected Tomczyk’s due process arguments. First, as to his contention that the reinstatement arbitrarily denied him the ability to remain in the United States with his United States Citizen wife, thus depriving him of family unity, the en banc court explained that the court previously rejected this argument. Second, Tomczyk argued that his original removal proceedings were fundamentally flawed because there was inadequate evidence to support the determination that he was inadmissible. Because Tomczyk failed to allege a gross miscarriage of justice that might permit review of his underlying order and because he failed to previously exhaust these arguments, the en banc court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider his challenge to the underlying order.
This opinion or order relates to an opinion or order originally issued on February 3, 2021.
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