Silva v. Barr, No. 16-70130 (9th Cir. 2020)
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The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review of the BIA's December 2015 order of removal, holding that the BIA did not err in relying on binding precedent to conclude that petitioner was removable on the ground that he was convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude. The panel discussed that, if it were writing on a clean slate, what categorical analysis it would use. However, because the panel was not writing on a clean slate, the panel held, according to binding precedent, that petty theft under section 484(a) of the California Penal Code is a crime involving moral turpitude.
The panel also denied the petition for review of the BIA's denial of petitioner's motion to reopen, holding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case for asylum or withholding of removal. Finally, the panel held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case for protection under the Convention Against Torture.
Court Description: Immigration. Denying Joel Empleo Silva’s petitions for review of decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the panel concluded that Silva’s conviction for petty theft under section 484(a) of the California Penal Code is a crime involving moral turpitude, and that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Silva’s motion to reopen to seek asylum and related relief based on changed country conditions in the Philippines. Silva was convicted of violating section 484(a) of the California Penal Code in 1998, 2004, and 2007. Addressing the BIA’s interpretation of crimes involving moral turpitude, the panel observed that, prior to 2016, the BIA had held that a theft offense did not categorically involve moral turpitude unless it involved a permanent taking, as distinguished from a temporary one. However, in Matter of Diaz-Lizarraga, 26 I. & N. Dec. 847 (BIA 2016), the BIA held that a theft offense may involve moral turpitude despite the fact that it does not require the accused to intend a literally permanent taking. This court subsequently held in Garcia-Martinez v. Sessions, 886 F.3d 1291 (9th Cir. 2018), that the BIA’s new rule would not apply to persons who were convicted before November 16, 2016, the date on which the BIA issued Matter of Diaz-Lizarraga. SILVA V. BARR 3 Addressing the elements of Silva’s conviction, the panel observed that, in People v. Davis, 19 Cal. 4th 301 (1998), the California Supreme Court explained in dicta that section 484(a) includes the intent to deprive the owner permanently of possession of the property, but the word permanently should not be taken literally, and temporary takings could amount to theft in some circumstances. In People v. Avery, 27 Cal. 4th 49 (2002), the California Supreme Court definitively held that a person could be convicted under section 484(a) even if that person did not intend to effect a literally permanent taking of property. The panel explained that, if it were writing on a clean slate, the categorical analysis would proceed as follows. Silva was convicted of violating section 484(a) in 1998, 2004, and 2007. According to Garcia-Martinez, at those times, the BIA’s generic definition of a theft offense involving moral turpitude required the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property. But by 1998, under Davis, it was questionable whether a violation of section 484(a) required that the offender intend a literally permanent deprivation of property, and by 2004, under Avery, it was clear that section 484(a) did not require such an intent. Therefore, at the time of at least two of Silva’s offenses, section 484(a) criminalized more conduct than the BIA’s generic theft offense involving moral turpitude, and so the state statute did not categorically define a crime involving moral turpitude. Thus, Silva would not be removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) because he was not convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude. However, the panel pointed out that it was not writing on a clean slate, and that both before and after Avery, this court held that section 484(a) was a crime involving moral 4 SILVA V. BARR turpitude. The panel noted that Garcia-Martinez put those earlier opinions in question because they failed to analyze the potential distinction between the intent requirement in section 484(a) and the BIA’s articulation of the intent required before Matter of Diaz Lizarraga. However, the panel concluded that it was nevertheless bound by circuit precedent. The panel explained that in this circuit, a three-judge panel must apply binding precedent even when it is clearly wrong because, for example, it failed to recognize an intervening change in the law. The panel noted that only an en banc court has the power to fix such errors. The panel further explained that a three-judge panel can reconsider the law of the circuit only when the relevant court of last resort has undercut the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable, or when a three- judge panel must follow an agency construction entitled to deference under Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005), neither of which apply here. The panel therefore held that Silva’s three separate violations of section 484(a) constitute crimes involving moral turpitude. Turning to Silva’s motion to reopen, the panel held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Silva’s motion to reopen because he failed to establish prima facie eligibility for asylum and related relief based on changed country conditions. Silva sought to reopen proceedings based on his history of drug use and his fear of persecution or torture under Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s anti-drug program. The panel noted that Silva did not contend that he suffered past persecution, and merely speculated that someone in the Philippines could report his past drug use to the government, or that he might succumb to the temptation to begin using drugs again. Because Silva failed to submit SILVA V. BARR 5 any specific evidence that such events might occur, the panel held that Silva failed to establish prima facie eligibility for relief. Judge Berzon concurred in the majority opinion in full, but wrote separately to reiterate her view that the phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” is unconstitutionally vague.
The court issued a subsequent related opinion or order on March 30, 2021.
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