Scott v. Gino Morena Enterprises, LLC, No. 16-56200 (9th Cir. 2018)
Annotate this CaseThe 90-day period referenced in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1) begins when the aggrieved person is given notice of the right to sue by the EEOC. Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, GME, ultimately alleging claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff's Title VII claims may be based on alleged acts occurring after she filed her first administrative charge only to the extent such acts are part of a single unlawful employment practice. In this case plaintiff's claims based on her first administrative charge were timely, but claims based on a second administrative charge were untimely. The panel explained that plaintiff could base her Title VII claims on GME's alleged acts occurring after she filed her first administrative charge to the extent she could show such acts were part of a single hostile work environment claim. The panel affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment only as to claims based on discrete discriminatory or retaliatory acts occurring after plaintiff filed her first administrative charge. The panel otherwise reversed and remanded.
Court Description: Employment Discrimination The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the defendant on claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The panel held that, under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), the 90-day period for filing a civil action, following exhaustion of administrative remedies, begins when the aggrieved person is given notice of the right to sue by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, rather than when the person becomes eligible to receive a right-to-sue notice from the EEOC. Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ claims based on her first administrative charge were timely. The panel held that the plaintiff’s claims based on a second administrative charge were untimely, but she could base her Title VII claims on the defendant’s alleged acts occurring after she filed her first administrative charge to the extent she could show such acts were part of a single hostile work environment claim. The panel affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment only as to claims based on discrete discriminatory or retaliatory acts occurring after the plaintiff filed her first administrative charge. The panel otherwise reversed and remanded.
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