United States v. Reinhart, No. 16-10409 (9th Cir. 2018)
Annotate this CaseThe Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence after he was convicted of two counts of possession of child pornography. The panel held that neither of defendant's prior California convictions constitute offenses "relating to" child pornography under 18 U.S.C. 2252(b)(2), which imposes a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. The panel held that because the terms "child pornography" and "sexually explicit conduct," are explicitly defined in chapter 110, the statutory text favored the narrower reading of "related to." Therefore, the panel did not depart from the usual, elements-based, categorical approach to determine whether defendant's prior state statutes of conviction trigger the federal mandatory minimum provision in 2252(b)(2) for individuals with prior offenses "relating to" child pornography. Under the categorical approach, the panel held that both California Penal Code 311.11 and 311.3 are overbroad compared to the federal statute and indivisible.
Court Description: Criminal Law The panel affirmed the district court’s imposition of a 78-month sentence for two counts of possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). The government argued that based on the defendants’ prior convictions for possession of child pornography (Calif. Penal Code § 311.11(a)) and sexual exploitation of child (Calif. Penal Code § 311.3(a)), he was subject to the ten-year mandatory minimum set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2) for having had a prior state conviction “relating to” the production, possession, receipt, mailing, sale, distribution, shipment, or transportation of child pornography. The government also argued that in determining whether the prior convictions trigger the § 2252(b)(2) enhancement, the usual Taylor categorical approach does not apply, because the words “relating to” in § 2252(b)(2) mandate a broader comparison of the offenses in the federal and state statutes than the usual comparison between the elements of the state and federal statutes. Because the terms “child pornography” and “sexually explicit conduct” are explicitly defined in the same statutory chapter as the sentencing enhancement provision at § 2252(b)(2), the panel did not depart from the usual, elements-based, categorical approach to determine whether
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