RICHARD MONTIEL V. KEVIN CHAPPELL, No. 15-99000 (9th Cir. 2022)
Annotate this Case
The California Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal and later summarily rejected “on the merits” Petitioner’s state habeas petition. Petitioner argued primarily that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Petitioner argued that the Ninth Circuit should review his Strickland claims de novo, because the California Supreme Court’s four-sentence denial of his claims “on the merits,” without issuing an order to show cause, signifies that the court concluded only that his petition did not state a prima facie case for relief such that there is no “adjudication on the merits” to which this court owes deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, citing Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011), in which the Supreme Court afforded AEDPA deference to the California Supreme Court’s summary denial of a habeas petition raising a Strickland claim. The court, therefore, applied the deferential AEDPA standard, asking whether the denial of Petitioner’s claims “involved an unreasonable application of” Strickland.
The court held, however, under AEDPA's highly deferential standard of review, that the California Supreme Court could reasonably have concluded that Petitioner’s claim fails under the second prong of Strickland. The court wrote that comparing the mitigation evidence that was offered with what would have been offered but for Petitioner’s trial attorney’s alleged errors, the state court could reasonably have decided that there was not a substantial likelihood that the jury would have returned a different sentence if the attorney had not performed deficiently.
Court Description: Habeas Corpus/Death Penalty. The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment denying Richard Galvan Montiel’s habeas corpus petition in which he challenged his California conviction and capital sentence for a 1979 robbery and murder. The California Supreme Court affirmed Montiel’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal and later summarily rejected “on the merits” Montiel’s state habeas petition. Montiel argued primarily that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), at his 1986 penalty-phase trial. The district court certified two issues for appeal: first, whether his penalty-phase attorney, Robert Birchfield, rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to present independent expert testimony from a psychopharmacologist that Montiel’s intoxication with phencyclidine (“PCP”) prevented him from being fully culpable for the crimes; and, second, whether Birchfield rendered ineffective assistance by failing to prepare defense witness Dr. Louis Nuernberger to testify regarding Montiel’s mental health. In addition to pressing those certified issues, Montiel argued that Birchfield was ineffective for failing to investigate and challenge the factual foundation for the opinion of prosecution expert Dr. Robert Siegel, and for failing to investigate and present evidence of Montiel’s psychosocial and family history to explain why he abused PCP and other drugs. MONTIEL V. CHAPPELL 3 Applying Browning v. Baker, 875 F.3d 444 (9th Cir. 2017), the panel expanded the certificate of appealability to include the latter two claims, and considered whether Birchfield’s performance, considered as a whole, amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel at the 1986 penalty trial. Montiel argued that this court should review his Strickland claims de novo, because the California Supreme Court’s four-sentence denial of his claims “on the merits,” without issuing an order to show cause, signifies that the court concluded only that his petition did not state a prima facie case for relief such that there is no “adjudication on the merits” to which this court owes deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The panel disagreed, citing Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011), in which the Supreme Court afforded AEDPA deference to the California Supreme Court’s summary denial of a habeas petition raising a Strickland claim—even though the state court had not issued an order to show cause. The panel therefore applied the deferential AEDPA standard, asking whether the denial of Montiel’s claims “involved an unreasonable application of” Strickland. The panel assumed, for the sake of argument, that the alleged errors constitute deficient performance under the first prong of Strickland. The panel held, however, under AEDPA's highly deferential standard of review, that the California Supreme Court could reasonably have concluded that Montiel's claim fails under the second prong of Strickland. The panel wrote that, comparing the mitigation evidence that was offered with what would have been offered but for Birchfield’s alleged errors, the state court could reasonably have decided that there was not a substantial likelihood that the jury would have returned a 4 MONTIEL V. CHAPPELL different sentence if Birchfield had not performed deficiently. The panel addressed uncertified issues in a memorandum disposition.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.