Giha v. Garland, No. 15-73085 (9th Cir. 2021)
Annotate this CaseThe Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Government on petitioner's United States citizenship claim. The panel concluded that petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to permit a rational trier of fact to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his parents obtained a legal separation, as required for him to derive U.S. citizenship under former section 321(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Even assuming arguendo that they did divorce and that petitioner's parents thereafter had a legitimate de facto union that would be recognized under Peruvian law, petitioner nonetheless failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that his parents were legally separated under Peruvian law. Because petitioner's petition for review presents no other grounds for avoiding his removal to Peru, the panel denied the petition.
Court Description: Immigration. Denying Caleb Fares Giha’s petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals and affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the Government on Giha’s United States citizenship claim, the panel concluded that Giha failed to present sufficient evidence to permit a rational trier of fact to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his parents obtained a “legal separation,” as required for him to derive U.S. citizenship under former § 321(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). In removal proceedings, Giha moved to terminate on the ground that, as a minor, he had acquired derivative U.S. citizenship upon his father’s naturalization in 1999. The IJ and BIA rejected that claim, and Giha petitioned this court for review. Concluding that Giha’s petition presented a genuine issue of material fact as to U.S. citizenship, a motions panel transferred his case to the district court for de novo review of that issue. The district court granted summary judgment for the Government, and the matter was restored to this court’s docket. Giha contended that the district court erred by applying a “preponderance of the evidence” standard to his citizenship claim. Under the burden-shifting framework set out in Mondaca-Vega v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 413 (9th Cir. 2015) (en GIHA V GARLAND 3 banc), if the Government satisfies its burden of showing evidence of foreign birth, a rebuttable presumption of alienage arises, and the burden shifts to the alleged citizen to present “substantial credible evidence” of citizenship. Giha argued that the “substantial credible evidence” standard imposes a burden that is lower than the preponderance standard. The panel disagreed, explaining that Mondaca- Vega’s use of “substantial credible evidence” is merely a shorthand way of saying that the alleged citizen must present sufficient evidence to carry his or her burden under the applicable standard of proof, and that the applicable standard here, as set out in the authority cited by Mondaca-Vega, is the preponderance standard. As relevant here, under the applicable naturalization statute, former INA § 321(a), a child born outside the U.S. of alien parents becomes a U.S. citizen upon the naturalization of the parent having legal custody of the child when there has been “a legal separation” of the parents, the naturalization takes place while the child is unmarried and under the age of 18, and the child is residing in the U.S. pursuant to a lawful admission for permanent residence at the time of the naturalization. 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a) (1999). Here, Giha’s claim turned on whether he proved that there was a legal separation of his parents. The panel explained that this court has held that parents cannot be said to have “legally separated” within the meaning of § 321(a) unless they had a validly recognized relationship in the first place. The panel concluded that, even assuming arguendo that Giha’s parents had a legitimate de facto union, Giha nonetheless failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that his parents were legally separated under Peruvian law. Giha alleged that his parents’ legal separation occurred as a result of orders issued by a Peruvian court, the evidence 4 GIHA V GARLAND about which consisted of: (1) two orders issued by the court authorizing Giha and his sister to travel to the U.S. with the father; and (2) Giha’s father’s declarations and deposition testimony about those proceedings. The panel explained that the evidence supported a reasonable inference that the court found that Giha’s mother had abandoned the home, that she lost some of her parental rights, and that the father obtained effective custody of the children. However, the panel explained that the statute required a showing “legal separation,” and nothing in the evidence supported the conclusion that the Peruvian court took any action with respect to the de facto union, much less that the court recognized a formal termination of any such relationship. Accordingly, the panel concluded that Giha failed to present sufficient evidence to permit a rational trier of fact to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his parents obtained a “legal separation.” The panel thus affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and, because Giha’s petition for review presented no other grounds for avoiding his removal to Peru, the panel denied the petition.
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