Alanniz v. Barr, No. 15-72792 (9th Cir. 2019)
Annotate this Case
Petitioner sought review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's pretermission of his application for cancellation of removal. The panel held that petitioner's continuous residency did not commence with his 1997 parole, but with his 2000 adjustment to LPR status.
The panel held that petitioner has not shown that his 1997 parole constitutes an "admission in any status" as that term is used in 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(2); petitioner is not entitled to any relief because the administrative record does not include his 1997 parole document; and petitioner has not shown that the BIA erred in concluding that he had not challenged the IJ's denial of relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). At the parties' mutual request, the panel remanded petitioner's asylum application for the fact-finding necessary to determine the viability of petitioner's proposed social group.
Court Description: Immigration. On petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the panel denied Jose Alanniz’s challenge to the pretermission of his application for cancellation of removal, holding that parole into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) is not an “admission in any status” for purposes of meeting the residency requirement for cancellation of removal, and remanded his asylum application for further fact-finding. To be eligible for cancellation of removal for certain permanent residents, an applicant must establish, as relevant here, that he or she has “resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status.” Because Alanniz’s period of residency was deemed to end when he was convicted of a drug offense in 2006, he had to show that he had been “admitted in any status” by at least 1999. Although Alanniz did not adjust to lawful permanent resident status until 2000, he contended that he met the residency requirement because his 1997 grant of parole constituted being “admitted in any status.” The BIA rejected that contention and found him ineligible for cancellation. The panel held that Alanniz’s parole was not an admission and, therefore, he was not “admitted in any status” until his later adjustment to lawful permanent resident status. ALANNIZ V. BARR 3 The panel explained that it was bound by Medina-Nunez v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2015), in which this court deferred to the BIA’s reading of “admitted in any status” as meaning that a person has been “admitted,” as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). In Medina-Nunez, the court also deferred to the BIA’s decision that acceptance into the Family Unity Program was not such an admission. Because the court held in Medina-Nunez that the BIA’s determination that even a specialized parole, such as acceptance into the Family Unity Program, did not constitute an admission, the panel concluded that Alanniz could not prevail on his argument that his 1997 parole constituted an admission. Accordingly, the panel concluded that Alanniz failed to obtain the seven years of continuous residency required for cancellation. The panel also rejected Alanniz’s contention that his case should be remanded on the ground that his 1997 parole document was not part of the administrative record, and held that Alanniz’s brief to the BIA did not challenge the denial of relief under the Convention Against Torture. Finally, the panel acceded to the parties’ request to remand Alanniz’s asylum claim to the agency to allow an Immigration Judge to undertake the initial fact-finding necessary to determine the viability of Alanniz’s proposed group, as defined by Alanniz.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.