Mendez-Garcia v. Lynch, No. 15-71931 (9th Cir. 2016)
Annotate this CasePetitioners Mendez-Garcia and Rivera-Baltazar claim in separate applications that removal would result in hardship to their respective sons, who were United States citizens under 21 years of age at the time of the application pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(D). While these applications were pending, petitioners’ sons turned 21 and no longer met the statutory definition of “child,” pursuant to section 1101(b)(1). The BIA denied relief. The court concluded that, because the BIA offered a reasonable interpretation of section 1229b, the IJ in each case did not err in considering whether Mendez-Garcia and Rivera-Baltazar had a qualifying relative for purposes of the hardship requirement as of the time of the decision on the application for cancellation of removal; even assuming that Matter of Isidro-Zamorano and the precedents on which it relies are factually distinguishable from the situations here, the BIA’s interpretation of the hardship requirement in section 1229b(b)(1)(D) would nonetheless be binding; the statutory definition of "child" controls because section 1101(b)(1) includes an explicit definition of the term; the decisionmaking process here did not violate Mendez-Garcia’s and Rivera-Baltazar’s due process rights; the court rejected petitioners' argument that their due process rights were violated because they had “settled expectations” that they could apply for and receive cancellation of removal, and these settled expectations were upset by the change in the status of their qualifying relatives; and the court rejected Mendez-Garcia's claim that his due process rights were violated based on the cap on grants of cancellation of removal. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions.
Court Description: Immigration. In consolidated cases, the panel denied Alberto Mendez- Garcia’s and Mario Rivera-Baltazar’s petitions for review from the Board of Immigration Appeals’s decisions denying cancellation of removal because while petitioners’ applications were pending their sons turned 21 and no longer met the definition of “child” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1). The panel held that the BIA reasonably interpreted 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) to require an alien applying for cancellation to establish hardship to a qualifying relative as of the time the Immigration Judge adjudicates the application. The panel thus held that the IJ in each case did not err in considering whether petitioners’ sons were qualifying relatives as of the time of the decision on the application. The panel held that petitioners’ due process rights were not violated by the agency’s failure to adjudicate their applications before their sons turned 21, by the denial of their MENDEZ-GARCIA V. LYNCH 3 applications for lack of a qualifying relative at the time of the IJ’s final decision, or because their “settled expectations” that they could apply for and receive cancellation were upset by the change in status of their qualifying relatives. The panel also held that Mendez-Garcia’s due process right to a “fundamentally fair proceeding” was not violated by the application of the statutory cap on grants of cancellation pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(e). Judge Watford concurred, joining the court’s opinion because it correctly resolved the cases, but writing separately to emphasize that the dispositive factor in denying petitioners’ procedural due process claim was their lack of diligence in pressing for expedited review of their applications.
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