Martinez-de Ryan v. Sessions, No. 15-70759 (9th Cir. 2018)
Annotate this CaseThe Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the Board's decision denying petitioner's application for cancellation of removal on the ground that she was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (bribery). The panel applied Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951), and Tseung Chu v. Cornell, 247 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1957), and held that a crime involving moral turpitude is not unconstitutionally vague. The panel held that Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967), does not foreclose consideration of whether a crime committed by a non-citizen constitutes a crime of moral turpitude so as to render her inadmissible. The panel also held that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018), extending to the immigration context its earlier opinion in Johnson, did not eviscerate the panel's holding in Tseung Chu such that the panel should overrule it. Therefore, the panel remained bound by Jordan and Tseung Chu.
Court Description: Immigration. The panel denied a petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial of Martinez-de Ryan’s application for cancellation of removal on the ground that she was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The panel rejected the government’s contention that the void-for-vagueness doctrine does not apply at all to any grounds of inadmissibility, such as crimes involving turpitude. Applying Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) (rejecting a void-for-vagueness challenge to the phrase “crime of moral turpitude”) and Tseung Chu v. Cornell, 247 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1957) (following Jordan), the panel held that the crime involving moral turpitude statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), is not unconstitutionally vague. The panel concluded that Jordan and Tseung Chu remain good law in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (concluding that the residual clause of the federal criminal code’s definition of “crime of violence” is unconstitutionally vague), and Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (extending Johnson’s holding to the immigration context). The panel explained that it was obliged to follow on-point Supreme Court precedent— here, Jordan—even if later Supreme Court cases cast some doubt on its general reasoning. The panel also pointed out MARTINEZ-DE RYAN V. SESSIONS 3 that Johnson and Dimaya interpret statutory “residual” clauses whose wording does not include the phrase “moral turpitude” and which are not tethered to recognized common law principles.
The court issued a subsequent related opinion or order on November 16, 2018.
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