Gugliuzza v. FTC, No. 15-55510 (9th Cir. 2017)
Annotate this CaseThis case stemmed from the FTC's successful enforcement action against debtor and his former company, Commerce Planet, for violation of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(a). On appeal, debtor challenged the district court's order reversing the bankruptcy court's grant of summary judgment and remanding for further fact-finding. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291 because the district court's order did not end the litigation on the merits and leave nothing for the district court to do but execute the judgment; the court lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1292 because the district court did not certify its decision for interlocutory review; the court lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 158(d)(1) where the district court's ruling did not end the discrete proceeding before it, namely the FTC's adversary action; and the court explained that Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank compelled the conclusion that rulings in bankruptcy cases that neither end a case nor a discrete dispute, but rather remand for further fact-finding on a central issue, were not final for purposes of section 158(d). Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal based on lack of jurisdiction.
Court Description: Bankruptcy. Dismissing an appeal, the panel held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s order, which reversed in part a bankruptcy court’s grant of summary judgment against a bankruptcy debtor and remanded for further fact-finding in an adversary proceeding brought by the Federal Trade Commission. The FTC sought a determination that a restitution debt arising from an FTC enforcement action was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). The district court held that the bankruptcy court correctly concluded that the debtor was collaterally estopped from relitigating four of the five elements necessary to prove nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(A), but had erred in holding that the debtor was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of his intent to deceive consumers. The district court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the bankruptcy court for further fact-finding on the issue of the debtor’s intent to deceive. The panel held that it lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because the district court’s judgment did not end the litigation on the merits. The panel lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 because the district court did not certify its decision for interlocutory review. IN RE GUGLIUZZA 3 The panel held that it also lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1), which gives courts of appeals jurisdiction of appeals from final bankruptcy decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees of district courts and bankruptcy appellate panels. The panel concluded that under Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 135 S. Ct. 1686 (2015), and Sahagun v. Landmark Fence Co. (In re Landmark Fence Co.), 801 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2015), the district court’s order did not alter the status quo or fix the rights and obligations of the parties. The panel held that Bonner Mall P’ship v. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. (In re Bonner Mall P’ship), 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993) and its progeny—which held that, for purposes of § 158(d)(1), final decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees include district court or BAP decisions remanding a central issue to the bankruptcy court for further fact-finding so long as the appeal raises a purely legal question or the decision on appeal could materially aid the bankruptcy court in its decisionmaking process—were inconsistent with Bullard and Landmark Fence and therefore no longer binding.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.