Welch v. Brown, No. 15-16598 (9th Cir. 2016)
Annotate this CasePlaintiffs filed suit alleging facial constitutional challenges to California’s law prohibiting state-licensed mental health providers from engaging in sexual orientation change efforts (SOCE) with minor patients (Senate Bill 1172, Business and Professions Code sections 865, 865.1, and 865.2). The court rejected plaintiffs' claim that SB 1172 violates the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment and that SB 1172 violates the privacy rights of their minor clients. In this case, SB 1172 does not regulate conduct outside the scope of the counselor-client relationship, and thus the law does not excessively entangle the State with religion. The court further concluded that the evidence falls far short of demonstrating that the primary intended effect of SB 1172 was to inhibit religion. The court rejected plaintiffs' claims under the Religion Clauses and declined to apply strict scrutiny where the court held in Pickup v. Brown that SB 1172 survives rational basis review because “SB 1172 is rationally related to the legitimate government interest of protecting the well-being of minors.” Finally, plaintiffs' privacy claim is foreclosed (see Pickup v. Brown). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.
Court Description: Civil Rights. The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment on the pleadings, entered in favor of the State of California, on remand from a preliminary injunction appeal, in an action challenging California’s Senate Bill 1172, which prohibits state-licensed mental health providers from engaging in “sexual orientation change efforts” with minor patients. The panel held that plaintiffs’ claims under the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment failed. The panel rejected plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim that Senate Bill 1172 excessively entangled the State WELCH V. BROWN 3 with religion and would prohibit, for example, certain prayers during religious services. The panel held that the scope of the law regulates conduct only within the confines of the counselor-client relationship. The panel rejected plaintiffs’ assertion that Senate Bill 1172 has the principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion because some minors who seek sexual orientation change efforts have religious motivations. The panel held that the prohibition against sexual change efforts applies without regard to the nature of the minor’s motivation for seeking treatment. The panel concluded that the operative provisions of SB 1172 were fully consistent with the secular purpose of preventing harm to minors and the evidence fell far short of demonstrating that the primary intended effect of SB 1172 was to inhibit religion. The panel further concluded that although the evidence considered by the legislature noted that some persons seek sexual orientation change efforts for religious reasons, the documents also stressed that persons seek change efforts for many secular reasons. The panel held that an informed and reasonable observer would conclude that the primary effect of SB 1172 is not the inhibition (or endorsement) of religion. For substantially the same reasons, the panel rejected plaintiffs’ argument that under the Free Exercise Clause, SB 1172 was not neutral. Finally, the panel held that plaintiffs’ privacy claim was foreclosed by the panel’s previous opinion which held that substantive due process rights do not extend to the choice of type of treatment or of a particular health care provider. 4 WELCH V. BROWN
The court issued a subsequent related opinion or order on October 3, 2016.
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