Johnson v. Gill, No. 15-16400 (9th Cir. 2018)
Annotate this CaseThe Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief for petitioner, who was criminally convicted in both state and federal court. Petitioner argued that his federal sentence actually commenced on one of the instances when the state prematurely transferred him to the federal authorities, and thus he should receive credit against his federal sentence for the period starting on the date he was erroneously turned over to federal authorities and including all his time in state prison after he was returned to state custody. The panel explained that because the state credited the time the federal authorities erroneously held petitioner against his state sentence, he effectively sought double-credit against both his state and federal sentences for the period between August 2009 and June 2011. The panel held that because these erroneous transfers did not manifest the state's consent to terminate its primary jurisdiction over petitioner, he was not in federal custody for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 3585(a), and therefore the federal sentence did not commence.
Court Description: Habeas Corpus. The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of Aubry Rea Johnson’s 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition challenging the Bureau of Prisons’ determination of when his federal sentence commenced. Johnson was convicted in state and federal court, with the federal sentence to run consecutively to the state sentence. While serving his state sentence, Johnson was twice erroneously turned over to federal authorities. The state credited the time Johnson spent in federal custody against his state sentence. Once his state sentence was complete and the Marshals Service took him into federal custody, the BOP concluded that Johnson’s federal sentence commenced in June 2011, when the federal government for the first time gained primary jurisdiction over him. Johnson argued that his federal sentence commenced on one of the instances when the state prematurely transferred him to federal authorities, and that, in addition to the credit he received against his state sentence, he should receive credit against his federal sentence for the period starting on the date he was erroneously turned over to federal authorities and including all his time in state prison after he was returned to state custody. The panel held that because the erroneous transfers did not manifest the state’s consent to terminate its primary jurisdiction over Johnson, he was not in federal custody for JOHNSON V. GILL 3 purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a), and therefore the federal sentence did not commence until June 6, 2011, when the federal government for the first time exercised exclusive penal custody over Johnson. Chief District Judge Oliver dissented. He would find (1) that the federal authorities obtained primary jurisdiction over Johnson when they took physical custody of his body, and his sentence commenced pursuant to § 3585(a) at that time; and (2) even if the federal authorities did not have primary jurisdiction when he was being detained by the Marshals, he nevertheless began his sentence pursuant to § 3585(a) because he was being held for the purpose of commencing his federal sentence.
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