Avena v. Chappell, No. 14-99004 (9th Cir. 2019)
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The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of habeas relief on a certified claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase. Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death by a California jury on two counts of first-degree murder for killings he committed during a carjacking.
The panel held that the California Supreme Court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in denying petitioner's claim for ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase. Reviewing de novo counsel's performance under Strickland v. Washington, the panel held that counsel rendered deficient performance by failing adequately to investigate petitioner's good character and social history, and he had no reasoned or tactical excuse for not doing so. The panel also held that counsel rendered deficient performance by not investigating petitioner's claim of self-defense in the jail homicide to counter the State's use of it as aggravation evidence. Furthermore, the state court's conclusion that petitioner failed to show prejudice was objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, the panel remanded with instructions.
Court Description: Habeas Corpus / Death Penalty. The panel reversed the district court’s judgment denying habeas relief on a certified claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase, in a case in which Carlos Avena was convicted and sentenced to death by a California jury on two counts of first-degree murder for killings he committed during a carjacking. Because the California Supreme Court did not address whether Avena’s counsel performed deficiently at the penalty phase, the panel reviewed counsel’s performance de novo. The panel held that Avena’s counsel rendered deficient performance by failing adequately to investigate Avena’s good character and social history, and had no reasoned or tactical excuse for doing so. The panel held that Avena’s counsel also rendered deficient performance by not investigating Avena’s claim of self-defense in a jail homicide to counter the State’s use of it as aggravation evidence, and had no reasonable or tactical excuse for not doing so. Because the California Supreme Court concluded that Avena was not prejudiced by his counsel’s performance, the panel reviewed the California Supreme Court’s decision regarding prejudice under AEDPA’s deferential standard. The panel held that the California Supreme Court’s conclusion that Avena failed to show prejudice was objectively unreasonable because the complete lack of AVENA V. CHAPPELL 3 mitigation evidence during the penalty phase all but ensured Avena’s fate, as the jury was given no reason to consider whether he deserved anything less than death. The panel wrote that it does not suggest that a state court’s conclusion of no prejudice is always unreasonable when defense counsel does not present any mitigation evidence, but that the mitigation evidence here was humanizing, painting Avena’s crimes in a different light and providing an explanation for the jail homicide. When weighing the totality of this mitigation evidence against the aggravation evidence, the panel concluded there remains a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have determined the circumstances did not warrant death, and that in the unusual circumstances of this case, no fairminded jurist could disagree. The panel remanded for the district court to grant the writ unless the state court resentences Avena within a reasonable time to be determined by the district court.
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