JEHAN MIR V. CITY OF TORRANCE, No. 14-56022 (9th Cir. 2016)

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOV 4 2016 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JEHAN ZEB MIR, M.D., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS No. 14-56022 D.C. No. 2:14-cv-01191-RGK-SH MEMORANDUM* CITY OF TORRANCE; et al., Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding Submitted October 25, 2016** Before: LEAVY, SILVERMAN, and GRABER, Circuit Judges. Jehan Zeb Mir appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Cir. 2003). We vacate and remand. The district court erred by dismissing Mir’s action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Parra v. PacifiCare of Ariz., Inc., 715 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Jurisdiction . . . is not defeated . . . by the possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which [a plaintiff] could actually recover.” (citation omitted)). We express no opinion on the merits of Mir’s action. On remand, the district court may consider, among other things, whether Mir’s complaint complies with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, whether Mir has alleged facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief, and whether Mir might be able to cure any potential pleading defects upon notice of any deficiencies. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must still present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Unless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect, . . . a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action.”). Mir’s request for transfer to another district court judge on the basis of bias, 2 14-56022 set forth in his opening brief, is denied. VACATED and REMANDED. 3 14-56022

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.