SUE WRIGHT V. CAROLYN COLVIN, No. 14-35066 (9th Cir. 2015)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MAR 11 2015 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS No. 14-35066 SUE MARIE WRIGHT, Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:12-cv-00723-MO v. MEMORANDUM* CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner Social Security Administration, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Michael W. Mosman, District Judge, Presiding Submitted February 13, 2015** Before: LEAVY, GRABER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges. Sue Marie Wright appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm. The district court did not deny Wright due process by ruling from the bench rather than issuing a written decision. The district court’s oral ruling, recorded in a written transcript, together with the administrative record, provide sufficient facts and reasoning to allow Wright an understanding of the disposition of her case, and to enable an informed review by this court. See Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1226 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that meaningful review of an administrative decision requires access to the facts and reasons supporting that decision); cf. United States v. Sesma-Hernandez, 253 F.3d 403, 405 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (holding that “oral findings on a transcribed record are sufficient to meet the ‘in writing’ requirement of due process” for a district court’s decision in a criminal case to revoke supervised release). The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) did not err in failing to evaluate evidence regarding Wright’s employment record from 2002. This evidence was not probative of whether Wright lacked the residual functional capacity to perform any work during the period beginning in October 2008, her alleged disability onset date. See Tobeler v. Colvin, 749 F.3d 830, 833 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Evidence is relevant when it has ‘any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence’”(quoting Fed. R. Evid. 401(a))). Even assuming 2 the evidence was relevant, any error on the part of the ALJ was harmless because the employment records “did not describe any limitations beyond those [Wright] herself described, which the ALJ discussed at length and rejected based on well-supported, clear and convincing reasons.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (footnote omitted). AFFIRMED. 3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
