United States v. Sprint Communications, No. 14-17434 (9th Cir. 2017)
Annotate this CaseThe court affirmed the denial of a motion to intervene in a False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733, suit brought by the Government against Sprint because the movant did not meet the requirements in the four-part test set out in Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Berg. John C. Prather had filed an earlier qui tam suit against Sprint and others, alleging the companies were defrauding federal and state governments. The Government elected not to intervene and the district court later dismissed Prather's suit for lack of jurisdiction. The Government then filed its own FCA suit against Sprint and the district court denied Prather's motion to intervene based on lack of standing. As a preliminary matter, the court agreed with the Fourth Circuit that the parties' settlement and dismissal of a case after the denial of a motion to intervene does not as a rule moot a putative-intervenor's appeal. Here, the Government's settlement agreement with Sprint and the dismissal of the underlying action did not moot this appeal. On the merits, Prather lacked a significantly protectable interest in this case, the statute's qui tam recovery provisions in section 3730(d) did not apply to relators jurisdictionally barred under section 3730(e)(4); and Prather cannot obtain a monetary bounty under the FCA on his jurisdictionally barred claims.
Court Description: False Claims Act / Intervention. The panel affirmed the district court’s order denying John Prather’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) motion to intervene as of right in a False Claims Act suit brought by the United States against Sprint Communications, Inc. In 2009, Prather filed a qui tam False Claims Act action (“Prather I”) against Sprint and other telecommunications companies; the government elected not to intervene. The district court concluded that Prather could not show he was an “original source” of publicly disclosed information regarding the telecommunications companies’ allegedly fraudulent activities, and dismissed Prather’s qui tam suit for lack of jurisdiction. While Prather’s appeal in Prather I was pending, the government filed its own False Claims Act suit against Sprint, and Prather moved to intervene. The panel held that Prather’s appeal was not moot. Specifically, the panel held that the parties’ settlement and dismissal of a case after the denial of a motion to intervene did not as a rule moot a putative-intervenor’s appeal. The panel concluded that reversing the district court’s order could afford Prather a possible avenue to some remedy, and therefore, the case was not moot. On the merits, the panel held that Prather did not have a significantly protectable interest in the government’s False PRATHER V. SPRINT 3 Claims Act action against Sprint. The panel further held that Prather’s prior filing of a related, but jurisdictionally barred, qui tam action did not entitle him to any award under the False Claims Act. The panel concluded that Prather was not entitled to intervene as of right in the government’s False Claims Act action against Sprint.
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