Weeden v. Johnson, No. 14-17366 (9th Cir. 2017)
Annotate this CaseSarah Weeden was convicted in California state court of felony murder and sentenced to twenty-nine years to life in prison for her role in a bungled robbery that occurred when she was fourteen. She was not present at the scene of the crime; the prosecution’s case rested on evidence of her role in planning and facilitating the robbery. Weeden’s defense at trial consisted entirely of four character witnesses. Trial counsel did not seek an evaluation by a psychologist or present expert testimony about the effect of Weeden’s youth on her mental state. In post-trial proceedings, counsel claimed that he did not obtain an evaluation because the result might not support his defense strategy. In her habeas corpus petition, Weeden claimed that her trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. The state courts rejected this claim, finding that counsel’s refusal to investigate psychological testimony was a reasonable strategic decision. The district court denied habeas relief; the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Court concluded that had an expert's testimony been presented to the jury, "the probability of a different result is 'sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'"
Court Description: Habeas Corpus. The panel reversed the district court’s denial of Sarah Weeden’s habeas corpus petition challenging her California felony-murder conviction for her role in a bungled robbery that occurred when she was fourteen, and remanded for issuance of the writ. Weeden claimed that her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to seek a psychological evaluation about the effect of her youth on her mental state. The panel held that the California Court of Appeal’s finding that counsel rendered adequate performance because he made a tactical decision not to investigate was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. The panel wrote that under Strickland v. Washington, counsel’s investigation must determine trial strategy, not the other way around; and that Weeden’s counsel could not have reasonably concluded that obtaining a psychological examination would conflict with his trial strategy without first knowing what such an examination would reveal. The panel held that had counsel presented to the jury the opinion of Dr. Lisa Perrine, Ph.D., a psychologist who evaluated Weeden after the verdict, the probability of a different result is sufficient to undermine confidence in the WEEDEN V. JOHNSON 3 outcome, and that counsel’s deficient performance therefore requires issuance of the writ. Dissenting, Judge Callahan wrote that the majority disregards the substantial deference federal courts owe to both trial counsel and state courts, and establishes, in essence, a per se rule regarding experts that will call into question many constitutionally-sound state convictions.
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