USA V. JORGE AGUERO-CARLOS, No. 14-10503 (9th Cir. 2016)
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED DEC 15 2016 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, No. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 14-10503 D.C. No. 4:13-cr-01824-CKJ-BGM-1 v. JORGE LUIS AGUERO-CARLOS, AKA Jorge Rosas-Ayueros, MEMORANDUM* Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Cindy K. Jorgenson, District Judge, Presiding Submitted December 13, 2016** San Francisco, California Before: GRABER and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and FOOTE,*** District Judge. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Elizabeth E. Foote, United States District Judge for the Western District of Louisiana, sitting by designation. After representing himself at trial, Jorge Luis Aguero-Carlos was convicted of illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). On appeal, Aguero challenges the validity of his waiver of the right to counsel and the district court’s excusing a potential juror for cause. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. 1. Aguero argues that his waiver of counsel was invalid because the magistrate judge conducting the Faretta colloquy failed to explain adequately the sentence enhancement sought in the indictment under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1). The record, however, supports the magistrate judge’s determination that Aguero was informed of, and understood the charges against him, including the enhancement. The judge did not err in concluding that Aguero’s waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and voluntary. See United States v. Erskine, 355 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2004). 2. Aguero also argues that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to remove a potential juror for cause. But Aguero does not challenge the impartiality of the jury that was ultimately impaneled. See United States v. Padilla-Mendoza, 157 F.3d 730, 733–34 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The core question here is whether defendant’s constitutional right to an impartial jury has been violated.”). Moreover, because the juror twice stated that he would find it difficult to be fair, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing him. See Merced v. McGrath, 426 F.3d 1076, 1081–82 (9th Cir. 2005). 2 AFFIRMED. 3
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