Vasquez-Valle v. Sessions, No. 13-74213 (9th Cir. 2018)
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The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision finding petitioner ineligible for cancellation of removal. The panel held that the BIA's determination that witness tampering under Oregon Revised Statutes 162.285 was a crime involving moral turpitude did not warrant deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), because the agency's analysis directly conflicted with circuit precedent, and was inconsistent both internally and with prior BIA decisions.
The panel held that Oregon Revised Statutes 162.285 was not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude because the statute captures conduct that was neither fraudulent nor base, vile, or depraved. Although the statute was divisible, the subsection that formed the basis for petitioner's conviction was likewise not a categorical match for a crime involving moral turpitude. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings.
Court Description: Immigration. The panel granted Orlando Vasquez-Valle’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal, holding that: (1) Vasquez-Valle’s conviction for witness tampering under Oregon Revised Statutes § 162.285 is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude; and (2) while the statute is divisible, the subsection under which Vasquez-Valle was convicted is not a categorical match for a crime involving moral turpitude. The panel concluded that the BIA’s determination that Oregon Revised Statutes § 162.285 is a crime involving moral turpitude did not warrant deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), because the BIA’s analysis directly conflicted with this court’s case law and was inconsistent both internally and with prior BIA decisions. The panel thus reviewed the BIA’s decision de novo. The panel observed that there are two categories of crimes involving moral turpitude: those involving fraud and those involving grave acts of baseness or depravity. Applying that generic definition to the plain text of the statute, the panel held that Oregon Revised Statutes § 162.285 is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude because the statute captures conduct that is neither fraudulent nor base, vile, or depraved. The panel further
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