United States v. Rodriguez-Vega, No. 13-56415 (9th Cir. 2015)
Annotate this CaseDefendant, convicted of misdemeanor Attempted Transportation of Illegal Aliens, appealed the magistrate judge’s denial of her 28 U.S.C. 2255 petition to vacate her conviction. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing. The court concluded, however, that the district court erred in failing to hold that counsel's performance was constitutionally ineffective. With respect to the ineffective performance prong, the district court erred because it applied the wrong legal standard. Here, the immigration statute expressly identifies defendant's conviction as a ground for removal. According to counsel's own declaration, before defendant pled guilty he never informed her that she faced anything more than the mere “potential” of removal. In this case, the immigration consequences of her plea were clear and her removal was virtually certain. Further, the government’s performance in including provisions in the plea agreement, and the district court’s performance at the plea colloquy, are simply irrelevant to the question of whether counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Moreover, counsel's statements made after defendant had already pled guilty do not satisfy his duty to accurately advise his client of the removal consequences of a plea before she enters it. The court further concluded that but for counsel’s deficient performance, defendant could similarly have negotiated a different plea agreement not requiring her removal. Therefore, defendant demonstrated prejudice. The court vacated the conviction and remanded.
Court Description: Habeas Corpus. Vacating a conviction of misdemeanor attempted transportation of illegal aliens, the panel held that the district court erred in failing to hold, upon a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, that defendant’s counsel was ineffective in failing to advise her that her plea agreement rendered her removal from the United States a virtual certainty. The panel held that the district court applied the wrong legal standard in deciding whether counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness because the law was clear on the immigration consequence of defendant’s plea where the immigration statute expressly identified defendant’s conviction as a ground for removal, rendering her removal practically inevitable. The panel held that the government’s performance in including provisions regarding removal in the plea agreement, and the district court’s performance at the plea colloquy, were irrelevant to the question whether counsel’s performance was adequate. In addition, counsel’s statements made after defendant had already pled guilty did not satisfy his duty to accurately advise her of the removal consequences of the plea before she entered into it. The panel held that defendant satisfied the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel test by showing a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient UNITED STATES V. RODRIGUEZ-VEGA 3 performance, she would have negotiated a different plea agreement not requiring her removal or, alternatively, would have gone to trial. The panel also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to conduct a full evidentiary hearing. The panel vacated the conviction and remanded the case to the district court.
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