Rouser v. White, No. 13-56152 (9th Cir. 2016)
Annotate this CasePlaintiff, a Wiccan, petitioned on behalf of himself and some thirty fellow Wiccan inmates that the prison recognize Wicca as a bona fide religion and afford its followers the same rights accorded to inmates of other faiths. The parties entered into a comprehensive settlement agreement (the 1997 Agreement). The parties subsequently entered into another settlement agreement, which the district court adopted as a consent decree (2011 Decree). The decree reaffirmed the promises the CDC made in the 1997 Agreement and provided plaintiff with additional privileges. At issue on appeal is the district court's decision to terminate the consent decree based on defendants' substantial compliance. The court accorded no special deference in reviewing the district court's exercise of discretion when the district court had supervised the consent decree only two years of the twenty-year history of the case. The court concluded that the district court committed numerous errors in terminating a consent decree that had been carefully crafted over the course of two decades; the district court applied the wrong legal standard and found substantial compliance without giving due attention to the various exacting obligations embodied in the decree, and without considering whether the purpose of the decree had been served; the district court improvidently refused to hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve material factual disputes about whether defendants had complied with the decree; and the district court also encouraged noncompliance by finding that defendants had violated the consent decree, yet refusing to grant any meaningful relief. The court held that under no circumstances should the district court consider terminating a decree unless and until there has been a substantial period of substantial compliance - in this case no less than a year - with every one of its terms. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order and reinstated the 2011 consent decree, remanding for further proceedings.
Court Description: Consent Decree. The panel vacated the district court’s order terminating a consent decree, reinstated the 2011 consent decree between a California state prisoner and defendant prison officials concerning the prisoner’s religious exercise of his Wiccan religion, and remanded for further proceedings. The panel accorded no special deference in reviewing the district court’s exercise of its discretion in terminating the consent decree where the district court had only supervised the litigation for two years of the twenty-year history of the case. The panel held that the district court committed numerous errors in terminating the consent decree. Specifically, the panel held that the district court applied the wrong legal standard and found substantial compliance by the prison officials without giving due attention to the various exacting obligations embodied in the decree, and without considering whether the purpose of the decree had been served. The panel also held that the district court improvidently refused to hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve material factual disputes about whether defendants had complied with the ROUSER V. WHITE 3 decree. The panel also held that the district court encouraged noncompliance by finding that defendants had violated the consent decree, yet the court refused to grant any meaningful relief. The panel concluded that the district court abused its discretion in terminating the consent decree. The panel held that the prisoner’s failure to receive the district court’s orders prejudiced his ability to allege violations of the 2011 decree. The panel held that the district court’s protracted failure to correct the pro se prisoner’s address, and its repeated failure to re-send notices of orders that had been returned as undeliverable, raised due process concerns. Judge Callahan dissented because the majority’s reversal of the district court improperly denied the heightened deference due a trial court’s finding that a consent decree aimed at institutional reform had served its purpose, was at odds with the Prison Litigation Reform Act, and was undermined by a record showing compliance that was substantial. Judge Callahan would also hold that the prisoner did not make a due process argument, and even if the district court made a due process error, the prisoner suffered no prejudice. 4 ROUSER V. WHITE
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