Godoy v. Spearman, No. 13-56024 (9th Cir. 2016)
Annotate this CasePetitioner, convicted of second degree murder, appealed the denial of habeas relief. In Tarango v. McDaniel, the court stated that Mattox v. United States “compels a criminal trial court to consider the prejudicial effect of any external contact that has a ‘tendency’ to influence the verdict.” The court held further that a tendency to influence the verdict exists per se and triggers a presumption of prejudice whenever there is “unauthorized external contact between a juror and a government agent, whose official position ‘beyond question carries great weight with a jury.’” Because the court is bound by Tarango, the court assumed that petitioner was entitled to a presumption of prejudice under clearly established federal law by a juror's alleged misconduct. Even assuming a presumption of prejudice applies in petitioner's case, however, the court concluded that the California Court of Appeal’s analysis did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law by concluding the government had rebutted the presumption. The court also concluded that, because the Court of Appeal did not act contrary to or unreasonably apply clearly established federal law when analyzing prejudice, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this ground; the court rejected petitioner's argument that the Court of Appeal unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when it concluded that the state trial court was within its discretion in refusing petitioner's request for an additional evidentiary hearing to investigate his juror misconduct claim; and petitioner is not entitled to relief where the trial court did not unreasonably deny his request for a third continuance where the trial judge had several reasons for denying the motion that were neither unreasonable or arbitrary. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.
Court Description: Habeas Corpus. The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment denying California state prisoner Enrique Anthony Godoy’s habeas corpus petition challenging his second-degree murder conviction based on juror misconduct, the denial of an evidentiary hearing, and the denial of a continuance. Because it was bound by Tarango v. McDaniel, 815 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2016), the panel assumed that Godoy was entitled under clearly established law to a presumption of prejudice from a juror’s alleged misconduct – i.e., that she was conferring with a “judge up north” during the trial. The panel held that the California Court of Appeal did not unreasonably apply clearly established law in concluding that the government had rebutted the presumption. The panel rejected Godoy’s contention that the California Court of Appeal unreasonably determined the facts by failing to consider additional evidence on direct appeal that Godoy offered in his state habeas petition. The panel rejected Godoy’s contention that the California Court of Appeal unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when it concluded that the state trial court was within its discretion in refusing Godoy’s request for an additional evidentiary hearing to investigate his juror misconduct claim. GODOY V. SPEARMAN 3 The panel held that the California Court of Appeal’s affirmance of the trial judge’s denial of Godoy’s motion for a third continuance was not unreasonable. Dissenting, Judge Fisher wrote that the California Court of Appeal denied an evidentiary hearing on the juror misconduct claim under the wrong legal rule, and then unreasonably applied Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954), in concluding the presumption of prejudice was rebutted.
The court issued a subsequent related opinion or order on March 2, 2017.
The court issued a subsequent related opinion or order on June 30, 2017.
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