Cohen v. City of Culver City, No. 13-55079 (9th Cir. 2014)
Annotate this CasePlaintiff filed suit against the City and the ECCC, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and various California statutes. Plaintiff tripped and fell as he tried to walk around a car show vendor's display blocking a curb ramp. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the City because the district court relied on an inapplicable legal standard and because there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the City denied plaintiff access to a public service or otherwise discriminated against him under Title II. Because the City was not entitled to summary judgment on the ADA claim, the district court erred by granting summary judgment for the City on plaintiff's claims under the California statutes. The court took no position on whether the City did in fact deny plaintiff access to a public service or discriminate against him by reason of disability under 42 U.S.C. 12132. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
Court Description: Americans with Disabilities Act. The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the defendants on claims under Title II the Americans with Disabilities Act and related California statutes. The plaintiff, an elderly man suffering from dementia who required a cane for mobility, was injured when he tripped and fell as he tried to walk around a car show vendor’s display blocking a curb ramp that provided disabled access to a sidewalk in Culver City, California. The plaintiff claimed that the City violated its obligations under Title II of the ADA by allowing the vendor’s display to completely block the curb ramp, impeding disabled access to the public sidewalk, and by failing to post signs identifying alternative disabled access routes. The panel held that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the City denied the plaintiff access to the sidewalk by reason of his disability. It held that the district court erred in reasoning that because the plaintiff could have accessed the sidewalk by taking a “marginally longer route” to a different curb ramp, he failed to establish that he was denied access to the sidewalk, because this standard applies when a public entity is modifying existing facilities to achieve ADA compliance under 28 C.F.R. § 35.150. Here, by contrast, the City was in compliance with the ADA but allowed elimination of the disabled access it had built. The panel concluded that the City’s conduct was more analogous to altering its sidewalks for reasons unrelated to ADA compliance, as contemplated by 28 C.F.R. § 35.151. The panel reversed the judgment of the district court as to the plaintiff’s claims against the City. It addressed claims against another defendant in an accompanying memorandum disposition. Judge Rawlinson dissented from the portion of the majority’s opinion reversing the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the City on the plaintiff’s claims under the ADA and related California statutes. She agreed with the district court that there was no showing that the plaintiff was excluded from accessing the public sidewalk because two available access routes existed when viewing the sidewalk in its entirety.
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