United States v. Marcia-Acosta, No. 13-10475 (9th Cir. 2015)
Annotate this CaseDefendant was convicted of unlawful reentry into the United States. In sentencing Defendant, the district court determined, using the modified categorical approach, that Defendant’s prior state conviction for aggravated assault was a “crime of violence” under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. In determining that Defendant had pled to the generic elements of aggravated assault, the court relied upon a single statement by defense counsel, during the state court plea colloquy, concerning the factual basis for the defendant’s plea. The Ninth Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence, holding that the district court’s application of the modified categorical approach contravened the principles underlying Descamps v. United States. Specifically, the Court held that in this case, where the Shepard documents did not prove that Defendant was convicted of the crime of intentional (or knowing) aggravated assault, the modified categorical approach was inappropriate. Remanded for resentencing.
Court Description: Criminal Law. The panel vacated a sentence imposed upon a defendant convicted of unlawful reentry into the United States, and remanded for resentencing, in a case in which the district court determined, using the modified categorical approach, that the defendant’s prior state conviction for aggravated assault, in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 13-1203 and 13-1204, was a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. The panel held that the district court’s application of the modified categorical approach contravened the principles underlying Descamps v. United States because the district court, in concluding that the defendant had pled to the generic elements of aggravated assault, relied solely upon a statement by defense counsel, during the state court plea colloquy, concerning the factual basis for the defendant’s plea. The panel emphasized that courts remain restricted to the modified categorical approach’s focus on the elements, rather than the facts, of a crime. The panel wrote that in a case like this one – in which there is no narrowing through the indictment, information, or other charging document, and no narrowing of the offense of conviction through the actual conviction documents or pleas – a sentencing court may not rely on an extraneous factual-basis statement detail, standing alone, to supply the narrowing for purposes of the modified UNITED STATES V. MARCIA-ACOSTA 3 categorical approach. The panel could say for sure only that the Shepard documents do not prove that the defendant was convicted of the crime of intentional (or knowing) aggravated assault, and so the modified categorical approach is not satisfied.
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