Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, No. 12-72326 (9th Cir. 2016)
Annotate this CaseAfter petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, pleaded guilty to violating California Penal Code 32, accessory to a felony, he was ordered removed. The IJ concluded that petitioner's conviction constituted an “offense relating to obstruction of justice” and therefore an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 101(a)(43)(S). The BIA dismissed petitioner's appeal and announced a new interpretation of “obstruction of justice” that requires only “the affirmative and intentional attempt, with specific intent, to interfere with the process of justice.” Contrary to the prior construction, this interpretation of INA 101(a)(43)(S) requires no nexus to an ongoing investigation or proceeding. The court agreed with petitioner that the agency's revised interpretation of the statute raises serious constitutional concerns about whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague. The court remanded to the agency so that it can either offer a new construction of INA 101(a)(43)(S) or, in the alternative, apply In re Espinoza-Gonzalez's interpretation to the instant case. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review.
Court Description: Immigration. The panel granted Augustin Valenzuela Gallardo’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ precedential published opinion in Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 838 (BIA 2012), holding that a conviction for accessory to a felony under California Penal Code § 32 is an aggravated felony “offense relating to obstruction of justice” under Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(43)(S). The panel wrote that the BIA’s revised interpretation of obstruction of justice to require only “the affirmative and intentional attempt, with specific intent, to interfere with the process of justice,” departed from its prior construction of the statute by requiring no nexus to an ongoing investigation or proceeding. The panel held that the new construction raises grave doubts about whether § 101(a)(43)(S), so construed, is unconstitutionally vague. The panel remanded for the BIA to apply its previous interpretation in In re Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 889 (BIA 1999) (en banc), or to offer a new construction. Dissenting, Judge Seabright wrote that the majority mistakenly found that the BIA in In re Espinoza-Gonzalez had previously required a nexus to an ongoing investigation or proceeding, and that the BIA’s opinion in Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo did not announce a new interpretation VALENZUELA GALLARDO V. LYNCH 3 removing the requirement. Judge Seabright wrote that rather Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo explicitly clarified language in In re Espinoza-Gonzalez in light of what the BIA considered to be this court’s misreading of BIA precedent in Hoang v. Holder, 641 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2011). Judge Seabright would also find that the absence of a requirement for an ongoing investigation or proceeding does not render the BIA’s definition vague, much less create grave constitutional doubts.
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