Reyes v. Lewis, No. 12-56650 (9th Cir. 2015)
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Petitioner, convicted of first degree murder, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground, inter alia, that his state-court conviction rested on a confession obtained in violation of
Missouri v. Seibert. The district court denied relief. The court held that, under Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, a postwarning statement must be suppressed if interrogating officers deliberately use the two-step interrogation technique that was used in Seibert, and if effective curative measures are not taken to ensure that the suspect genuinely understood the Miranda warnings. Under the circumstances of this case - where police interrogated petitioner, a fifteen-year-old, over the course of two days; where on the first day at the Riverside police station they conducted a two-hour unwarned interrogation; where on the second day at the San Bernardino sheriff’s station they obtained a confession during an unwarned interrogation
following an unwarned polygraph test; and where they transported petitioner back to the Riverside police station and obtained a postwarning confession “clarifying” what he had stated at the sheriff’s station - a Seibert analysis was clearly required. Contrary to Seibert, the Court of Appeal did not conduct such an analysis. The Court of Appeal addressed, and treated
as dispositive, the question whether petitioner’s postwarning statement was voluntary, which is precisely the question that is irrelevant under Seibert. Therefore, the court concluded that the decision was “contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” The court concluded that the officers in this case deliberately employed the two-step interrogation technique condemned in Seibert, and that the magistrate judge and the district court clearly erred in concluding otherwise. The court reversed and remanded with instructions to grant habeas relief.
Court Description: Habeas Corpus. The panel reversed the district court’s denial of a habeas corpus petition alleging that petitioner’s state-court conviction rested on a confession obtained in violation of Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). The panel held that for the purpose of review under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Siebert constitutes “clearly established” Supreme Court law. Under this concurrence, a post-Miranda-warning statement must be suppressed if interrogating officers deliberately use the two-step interrogation technique that was used in Siebert, and if effective curative measures are not taken to ensure that the suspect genuinely understood the Miranda warnings. The two-step technique involves interrogating in successive, unwarned and warned phases. The panel held that under the circumstances of this case¯ where police interrogated the fifteen-year-old petitioner over the course of two days; where on the first day at a police station they conducted a two-hour unwarned interrogation; where on the second day at a sheriff’s station they obtained a confession during an unwarned interrogation following an unwarned polygraph test; and where they transported the petitioner back to the police station and obtained a REYES V. LEWIS 3 postwarning confession “clarifying” what he had stated at the sheriff’s station¯a Siebert analysis was clearly required. The panel held that because the state court did not conduct such an analysis, its decision was contrary to clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, and thus was owed no deference. The panel held that the district court clearly erred in finding that the law enforcement officers had not deliberately employed the two-step interrogation process. In addition, the officers did not take effective curative measures. The panel held, alternatively, in agreement with the concurrence, that the state court’s conclusion that sufficient curative measures were taken was an unreasonable determination of the facts. The panel reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the writ unless the petitioner was tried within a reasonable time, not to exceed 180 days. Concurring, District Judge Singleton wrote that a Siebert analysis includes two parts. First, the court asks whether the two-step interrogation procedure was chosen intentionally in order to render subsequent Miranda warnings ineffective. Second, the court asks if the two-step process, whether or not intentional, rendered the subsequent warnings ineffective. Judge Singleton wrote that the state court followed Siebert by applying the second part of the test and concluding that sufficient curative measures were taken. Reviewing the first part of the test de novo, because the state court did not address it, Judge Singleton agreed with the majority that the use of the two-step procedure was a conscious effort to undermine Miranda. Granting deference to the state court on the second part of the Siebert test, Judge Singleton wrote that the state court’s finding was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 4 REYES V. LEWIS
The court issued a subsequent related opinion or order on August 17, 2016.
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