Brooks v. Yates, No. 12-17607 (9th Cir. 2016)
Annotate this CasePetitioner, convicted of first-degree murder, appealed the denial of his motion for relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. Pro 60(b) after the district court's dismissal of his habeas petition as time-barred. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that petitioner failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to Rule 60(b) relief under a theory of “actual innocence.” In this case, petitioner failed to cite any cases where actual innocence was held to constitute an “extraordinary circumstance” for Rule 60(b)(6) purposes. Assuming arguendo that the “Schlup gateway” is available to support a Rule 60(b) motion, petitioner has fallen well short of raising sufficient doubt about his guilt to undermine confidence in the result of the trial. Further, the declarations petitioner seeks to offer as evidence of actual innocence are not "new" for purposes of Rule 60(b) because they were available when he filed his initial habeas petition. The court also concluded that the district court abused its discretion in finding that petitioner was not abandoned by his counsel, Gregory Mitts, where Mitts was grossly negligent in his representation; the district court did not make findings with respect to whether petitioner was reasonably diligent; and, therefore, the court remanded for the district court to determine this issue in the first instance. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Court Description: Habeas Corpus. The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s denial of California state prisoner Rowan Brooks’s motion for relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) following the dismissal of his habeas petition as untimely, and remanded. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that Brooks failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to Rule 60(b) relief under a theory of “actual innocence.” The panel wrote that assuming arguendo that the “Schlup gateway” is available to support a Rule 60(b) motion, Brooks has fallen well short of raising sufficient doubt about his guilt to undermine confidence in the result of the trial. The panel noted further that the declarations Brooks sent to offer as evidence of actual innocence were not “new” for purposes of Rule 60(b). The panel held that the district court abused its discretion in finding that Brooks was not abandoned by his counsel. The panel explained that the question with respect to Brooks’s Rule 60(b) motion is not whether his counsel, Gregory Mitts, abandoned Brooks for purposes of equitable tolling, but whether extraordinary circumstances prevented Brooks from taking timely action to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment. The panel held that the record demonstrates that Mitts was grossly negligent in his BROOKS V. YATES 3 representation of Brooks at the time the district court ordered Brooks to show cause why his petition should not be dismissed as untimely. The panel observed that the district court did not make findings with respect to whether Brooks acted diligently in pursuing relief from the district court’s judgment dismissing his petition, a requirement for relief under Rule 60(b)(6), and remanded for the district court to make such a determination. Concurring, Judge Kozinski wrote separately to highlight that Mitts continues to practice law in California with no mark on his record that would apprise prospective clients of the grave risks of hiring him to represent them.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.