Arizona v. Raytheon Co., No. 12-15691 (9th Cir. 2014)
Annotate this CaseThis case concerns liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601-75, and its state law counterpart, the Arizona Water Quality Assurance Revolving Funds, A.R.S. 49-281-391, for cleanup costs resulting from the contamination of the Broadway-Patano Landfill Site. The court reaffirmed that a district court has an obligation to independently scrutinize the terms of proposed consent decrees by, inter alia, comparing the proportion of total projected costs to be paid by the settling parties with the proportion of liability attributable to them. The court concluded that the district court properly declined to issue declaratory relief regarding the intervening parties' future CERCLA liability; held that the district court erred in entering the parties' proposed CERCLA consent decrees because the district court failed to independently scrutinize the terms of the agreements, and in so doing, afforded undue deference to the ADEQ; and therefore, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
Court Description: Environmental Law. The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s order approving consent decrees in an action under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act. The panel reaffirmed that a district court has an obligation to independently scrutinize the terms of CERCLA consent decrees by, among other things, comparing the proportion of total projected costs to be paid by the settling parties with the proportion of liability attributable to them. The panel concluded that the district court properly declined to issue declaratory relief regarding intervening parties’ future CERCLA liability because the intervenors did not request such relief in their complaints. The panel further held that the district court erred in entering the parties’ proposed CERCLA consent decrees, because the court failed to independently scrutinize the terms of the agreements, and in so doing, afforded undue deference to the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality. Judge Callahan concurred in part and dissented in part. She agreed with Part I of the majority’s decision where it concluded that the district court properly denied the intervenors’ request for declaratory relief. She dissented from Part II of the majority’s decision because she would conclude that the district court properly approved the proposed consent decrees.
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