MARCUS WARD V. SHERMAN CHAMPEN, No. 12-15084 (9th Cir. 2013)
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FILED JAN 03 2013 NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MARCUS BENJAMIN WARD, Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 12-15084 D.C. No. 2:10-cv-01942-MCEDAD v. SHERMAN CHAMPEN, N.P.; et al., MEMORANDUM* Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Morrison C. England, Jr., Chief Judge, Presiding Submitted December 19, 2012** Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and FISHER, Circuit Judges. California state prisoner Marcus Benjamin Ward appeals pro se from the district court s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment because Ward failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants were deliberately indifferent to his shoulder pain. See id. at 1057-58 (a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he or she knows of and disregards an excessive risk to an inmate s health and safety; neither negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical need, nor a prisoner s difference of opinion concerning the course of treatment, amounts to deliberate indifference). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ward s motion for a continuance of summary judgment because Ward failed to identify particular facts he hoped to discover to raise a genuine dispute of material fact. See Hancock v. Montgomery Ward Long Term Disability Trust, 787 F.2d 1302, 1306 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1986) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a party seeking to continue summary judgment has the burden of showing what facts he or she hopes to discover to raise a triable dispute). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ward s motion to extend discovery because Ward failed to show good cause to amend the scheduling order. See Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-08 (9th Cir. 2 12-15084 1992) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a party seeking to amend a scheduling order must show good cause). We reject Ward s contention that the district court erred in denying his motion to certify counsel. AFFIRMED. 3 12-15084
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