United States v. Sullivan, No. 12-10196 (9th Cir. 2014)
Annotate this CaseDefendant appealed his convictions and sentences for producing and possessing a sexually explicit video depicting a fourteen-year-old girl (Counts 1 and 2 respectively). The court concluded that venue was proper in regards to Count 1, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a); Count 1 and Count 2, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B), were constitutionally applied to defendant; the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence contained from his laptop where the district court did not err in striking the balance between the intrusion into defendant's interest and the opposing law enforcement interests in favor of the government; because defendant's prior convictions for unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor under 16 years of age and oral copulation with a minor under 16 years of age categorically relates to sexual abuse as that phrase is ordinarily understood, the district court properly applied the mandatory minimum enhancement provisions to defendant's prior state convictions. Because the court could not tell if the district court would impose the same sentence if it applied the correct legal analysis when sustaining defendant's objection to the inclusion of a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. 3C1.1, the court remanded for resentencing. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing.
Court Description: Criminal Law. The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part a criminal judgment in a case in which the defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and 2252(a)(4)(B) for producing and possessing a sexually explicit video depicting a fourteen- year-old girl. The panel held that venue in the Northern District of California for the production count was not improper. The panel also held that National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), does not undermine this court’s precedent that Congress may regulate even purely intrastate production of child pornography and criminalize its intrastate possession. The panel held that the district court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from his laptop computer. Balancing the nature of the intrusion into the defendant’s possessory interests against the governmental interests justifying the intrusion, the panel concluded that the government’s seizure and retention of the laptop for 21 days before obtaining a search warrant was, under the totality of the circumstances, not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The panel held that the conduct proscribed by Cal. Penal Code § 261.5(d) (unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor under 16 years of age) and Cal. Penal Code § 288a(b)(2) (oral copulation with a minor under 16 years of age) is categorically a conviction “under the laws of any State relating to . . . sexual abuse” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(e) and 2252(b)(2), and that the district court therefore properly applied the mandatory minimum enhancement provisions contained in §§ 2251(e) and 2252(b)(2). On the government’s cross-appeal, the panel held that the district court erred in its legal analysis when sustaining the defendant’s objection to the inclusion of a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The panel remanded for resentencing because it could not tell if the district court would impose the same sentence if it applied the correct legal analysis.
The court issued a subsequent related opinion or order on July 29, 2015.
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