United States v. French, No. 12-10185 (9th Cir. 2014)
Annotate this CaseDefendant appealed her convictions and sentence for wire fraud, mail fraud, and money laundering. Defendant and her then-husband were involved in a scheme to defraud customers by tricking them into making advanced payments for high-end kitchen appliances which were never delivered. The court rejected defendant's claim that the Faretta colloquy was rendered constitutionally deficient by the omission of an explicit warning about a potential conflict of interest, particularly because plaintiff's husband had no involvement in defendant's individual self-representation at this stage of the proceedings; defendant's waiver of the right to counsel was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent; during trial, defendant's right to self-representation was not violated when she adopted the district court's suggestion to permit her husband to conduct her direct and re-direct examination; the evidence was sufficient to support her convictions for wire and mail fraud; the district court properly instructed the jury regarding the mens rea for these offenses; the evidence was insufficient to support defendant's convictions on two money laundering counts; and the jury was improperly instructed as to one of these charges. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing in light of the reversal of her convictions on the money laundering counts.
Court Description: Criminal Law. The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part a criminal judgment in a case in which the government alleged that the defendant and her then-husband, both of whom proceeded to trial pro se, defrauded customers by tricking them into making advance payments for high-end kitchen appliances which were never delivered. The panel rejected the defendant’s contention that the district court’s Faretta colloquy was deficient by the omission of an explicit warning about a potential conflict of interest in this multi-defendant prosecution, and held that the defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The panel held that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to self-representation was not violated when she adopted the district court’s suggestion to permit her husband to conduct her direct and re-direct examination. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial “in the interests of justice.” The panel held that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for wire and mail fraud, and that the district court properly instructed the jury regarding the mens rea for these offenses. The panel held that the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s convictions on two money laundering counts, and that the jury was improperly instructed as to one of these charges, where the district court failed to define “proceeds” as “profits.” The panel remanded for resentencing in light of the reversal of her convictions on the money laundering counts. Dissenting, Judge Noonan wrote that the examination at trial of a pro se defendant by an interested, non-lawyer co- defendant is a structural constitutional defect not amenable to harmless error analysis.
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