Negrete-Ramirez v. Holder, Jr., No. 10-71322 (9th Cir. 2014)
Annotate this CasePetitioner, admitted to the United States on a B2 visitor visa, petitioned for review of the BIA's order dismissing her appeal, contending that the BIA erred in determining that the statutory language of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1182(h)("212(h) waiver"), excludes her from eligibility to apply for an inadmissibility waiver under section 212(h). The court concluded that the plain language of section 212(h) unambiguously demonstrated that petitioner's post-entry adjustment of status to an LPR after her admission to the United States as a visitor did not constitute an admission in the context of section 212(h). Only noncitizens who entered in the United States as LPRs are barred from eligibility to apply for the 212(h) waiver. Accordingly, petitioner was not barred from applying for the waiver and the court granted the petition for review.
Court Description: Immigration. The panel granted Juana Negrete-Ramirez’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision finding that the statutory language of the Immigration and Nationality Act excludes her from eligibility to apply for a waiver of inadmissibility under Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(h). The panel held that under the plain language of INA § 212(h) only non-citizens who entered the United States as lawful permanent residents are barred from eligibility to apply for waiver. The panel held that Negrete-Ramirez is not barred from applying for a waiver, because her post-entry adjustment of status to a lawful permanent resident after her admission to the U.S. does not constitute an admission in the context of INA § 212(h). Concurring, Judge Berzon wrote separately to comment on the BIA’s precedential opinions affecting the interpretation of INA § 212(h). Judge Berzon wrote that the overall premise of the BIA’s opinions is that the plain language approach to the incorporation of the definition of “admission” and “admitted” in INA § 101(a)(13) cannot suffice, both in general and with regard to the INA § 212(h) waiver, but that she is persuaded rather by the majority opinion’s approach applying a plain words interpretation to the statutory definition of “admission” and “admitted” in the INA when it is sensible to do so.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.