Cano v. Taylor, No. 10-17030 (9th Cir. 2014)
Annotate this CasePlaintiff, a former prison inmate, filed suit alleging deliberate indifference to his mental health needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment (Count I), and violations of his right to freely exercise his religious beliefs and to have access to the courts, in violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendments (Counts II and III). On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on Count I, dismissal of Counts II and III, and denial of appointment of counsel and informa pauperis (IFP) status. The court concluded that plaintiff's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were mooted by his release from prison. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on Count I where the record indicated that prison mental healthcare professionals were incredibly responsive to plaintiff's needs and no reasonable trier of fact could find that there was deliberate indifference to plaintiff's complaints; affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's request for counsel where plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the merits and he has been able to articulate his legal claims; vacated the dismissal of Counts II and III because it was based on the determination that plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies prior to the filing of his initial complaint, rather than his amended complaint; and remanded for the district court to consider plaintiff's attempts to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Court Description: Prisoner Civil Rights. The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment and denial of appointment of counsel and vacated in part the district court’s dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act and remanded in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action brought by a former prison inmate who alleged deliberate indifference to his mental health needs, and violations of his right to freely exercise his religious beliefs and have access to the courts. The panel determined that plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were mooted by his release from prison. The panel held that plaintiff’s claim regarding inadequate medical care amounted to a difference of opinion as to his medical treatment, which was not actionable. The panel therefore affirmed the district court’s summary judgment on that claim. The panel also affirmed the district court’s denial of plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel, determining that plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the merits, and could adequately present his claims pro se. The panel held that the district court incorrectly dismissed the religious freedom and access to the courts claims as unexhausted under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The panel held that federal claims that arise as a cause of action prior to the filing of the initial complaint may be added to a complaint via an amendment, as long as they are administratively exhausted prior to the amendment. Therefore, for purposes of the exhaustion requirement, the date of the First Amended Complaint’s filing is the proper yardstick. The panel remanded for further proceedings as to those claims. Dissenting as to Part II(D), Judge Silverman stated that under Ninth Circuit precedent a prisoner may not file first, then exhaust later. Judge Silverman would therefore affirm the district court in all respects.
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