Court Description: [Per Curiam - Before Shepherd, Kelly and Stras, Circuit Judges] Criminal case - Criminal case. Anders case. Defendant's challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and the denial of a motion to suppress were foreclosed by the appeal waiver in his guilty plea; the district court did not err in determining defendant was a career offender; no error in denying defendant's request for an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction when defendant was caught with a controlled substance while in jail after his arrest. [ December 09, 2020 ]
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United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________ No. 20-1580 ___________________________ United States of America lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee v. Conrad Fred Taylor, Jr., also known as C.J. lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant ____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa - Central ____________ Submitted: December 4, 2020 Filed: December 11, 2020 [Unpublished] ____________ Before SHEPHERD, KELLY, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. ____________ PER CURIAM. Conrad Taylor received a 144-month prison sentence after he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 846. In an Anders brief, Taylor’s counsel requests permission to withdraw and raises the denial of an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction as an issue for our review. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. Taylor has also filed two pro se briefs in which he challenges a career-offender enhancement, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the failure to suppress evidence. We affirm. Taylor is foreclosed from raising the latter two challenges by a broad appeal waiver in the plea agreement that covers “all . . . objections” to his conviction. See United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889–92 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Based on prior felony assault and drug convictions, he also qualifies as a career offender. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) (defining a “career offender” as someone who “has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense”); United States v. Clayborn, 951 F.3d 937, 940 (8th Cir. 2020) (recognizing that a conviction of possession with intent to deliver under Iowa Code § 124.401(1)(d) is a controlled-substance offense); United States v. Quigley, 943 F.3d 390, 393–95 (8th Cir. 2019) (concluding that a conviction for assault with intent to inflict serious injury under Iowa Code § 708.2 qualifies as a crime of violence). Moreover, the district court1 had reason to deny an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction after Taylor was caught with a controlled substance in jail. See United States v. Byrd, 76 F.3d 194, 197 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that the district court may consider even “unrelated criminal conduct in denying an acceptance[-]of[-]responsibility reduction”). Finally, we have independently reviewed the record and conclude that no other non-frivolous issues exist. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988). We accordingly affirm the judgment, grant counsel permission to withdraw, and deny Taylor’s pro se motion for appointment of counsel and discovery. ______________________________ 1 The Honorable Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa. -2-
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