United States v. Tremayne Scoggins, No. 20-1358 (8th Cir. 2020)
Annotate this CaseCourt Description: [Per Curiam - Before Loken, Shepherd and Stras. Criminal case - Sentencing. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Scoggins's motion for First Step Act relief; Scoggins was not entitled to a plenary resentencing, nor could he use his First Step motion to challenge his original sentence.
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United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________ No. 20-1358 ___________________________ United States of America lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee v. Tremayne Scoggins lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant ____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock ____________ Submitted: September 28, 2020 Filed: October 1, 2020 [Unpublished] ____________ Before LOKEN, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. ____________ PER CURIAM. After considering a number of factors, the district court 1 decided not to reduce Tremayne Scoggins’s 360-month prison sentence under the First Step Act. See Pub. 1 The Honorable Susan Webber Wright, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018). Though he challenges the decision on a host of grounds, we affirm. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion. See United States v. McDonald, 944 F.3d 769, 771–72 (8th Cir. 2019) (discussing the standard of review and outlining the two-step analysis for motions under the First Step Act). The First Step Act did not require the court to reduce Scoggins’s sentence, even if he was eligible. § 404(c), 132 Stat. at 5222 (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to require a court to reduce any sentence pursuant to this section.”). And the court did more than enough by considering the statutory sentencing factors before making a decision. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); United States v. Moore, 963 F.3d 725, 727 (8th Cir. 2020) (explaining that, in reviewing a First Step Act motion, “a district court may, but need not, consider the section 3553 factors”). Scoggins’s remaining arguments fare no better. He was not entitled to a plenary resentencing hearing, nor can he now challenge his original sentence. See Moore, 963 F.3d at 728 (explaining how motions under the First Step Act are different from “original, plenary sentencing” proceedings); United States v. Williams, 943 F.3d 841, 843–44 (8th Cir. 2019) (holding that district courts need not hold hearings on these motions); see also United States v. Denson, 963 F.3d 1080, 1089 (11th Cir. 2020) (refusing to entertain an attack on the original sentence in one of these motions). We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court and grant counsel permission to withdraw. ______________________________ -2-
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