Sours v. Karr, No. 18-2814 (8th Cir. 2019)

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Plaintiff appealed the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against Police Chief Kitch and Officers Karr, Bland and McIntosh. The Eighth Circuit held that the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's official capacity claims and that Kitch was entitled to summary judgment in his individual capacity.

The court also held that the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's claim that Karr violated his rights by conducting a traffic stop of his vehicle; the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on plaintiff's claim that Karr violated his rights by extending the traffic stop for a drug-dog sniff because, at the time of the traffic stop, it was not clearly established that the extension of the stop was unconstitutional; Karr and Bland were entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claim that they violated his rights by searching his truck; McIntosh was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claim related to his arrest on a stolen property charge, because it was beyond genuine dispute that, when McIntosh submitted his probable cause statement, he was aware of facts warranting a belief that plaintiff had possessed stolen property; and the district court did not resolve the issues surrounding plaintiff's claim that Karr violated his rights by arresting him for violating a city obstruction ordinance. Accordingly, the court vacated in part and remanded for consideration of the obstruction claim. The court affirmed in all other respects.

Court Description: Per Curiam - Before Loken, Wollman and Kelly, Circuit Judges] Civil case - Civil rights. The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendants on all of plaintiff's official-capacity claims; the court properly granted summary judgment to defendant Karr on plaintiff's claims Karr violated his rights by conducting a traffic stop of plaintiff's vehicle and that Karr improperly extended the traffic stop for a dog-sniff; defendants Karr and Bland were entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claims they violated his rights by searching the truck after the dog alerted; defendant McIntosh was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claim related to his arrest on a stolen property charge as there was probable cause for a belief that plaintiff possessed stolen property; however, the district court did not resolve plaintiff's claim that the Karr violated his rights by arresting him for violating the City of Duquesne's obstruction ordinance with sufficient clarity to permit appellate review, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings on that claim.

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United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________ No. 18-2814 ___________________________ William Scott Sours lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant v. Chad Karr, City of Duquesne, MO Police Officer; Tommy Kitch, City of Duquesne, MO Chief of Police; J. Bland, City of Joplin, MO K-9 Officer; Darren McIntosh, City of Joplin, MO Police Department Detective lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees Dean Dankelson, Jasper County Prosecuting Attorney lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant ____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri - Joplin ____________ Submitted: December 5, 2019 Filed: December 10, 2019 [Published] ____________ Before LOKEN, WOLLMAN, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. ____________ PER CURIAM. William Sours appeals the district court’s adverse grant of summary judgment in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against City of Duquesne police chief Tommy Kitch, City of Duquesne police officer Chad Karr, and City of Joplin police officers Jeremy Bland and Darren McIntosh. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. First, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment on Sours’s official-capacity claims. See Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 997 (8th Cir. 2010) (official-capacity suit against municipal official is suit against municipality); see also Mick v. Raines, 883 F.3d 1075, 1079-80 (8th Cir. 2018) (de novo review of grant of summary judgment; discussing municipal liability under § 1983). We further conclude that Chief Kitch was entitled to summary judgment in his individual capacity. See Brockinton v. City of Sherwood, 503 F.3d 667, 673 (8th Cir. 2007) (discussing failure-to-supervise and failure-to-train claims). Next, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment on Sours’s claim that Karr violated his rights by conducting a traffic stop of his vehicle. See United States v. Washington, 455 F.3d 824, 826 (8th Cir. 2006) (traffic stop is reasonable if it is supported by probable cause or articulable and reasonable suspicion that traffic violation has occurred). We also conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Sours’s claim that Karr violated his rights by extending the traffic stop for a drug-dog sniff, because, at the time of the May 2014 traffic stop, it was not clearly established that the extension of the stop was unconstitutional. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (official is entitled to qualified immunity if, at time of violation, it was not clearly established that conduct was unconstitutional); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 741 F.3d 905, 907 (8th Cir. 2014), vacated and remanded 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015). In addition, we conclude that Karr and Bland were entitled to summary judgment on Sours’s claim that they violated his rights by searching his truck. See United States v. Olivera-Mendez, 484 F.3d 505, 512 (8th Cir. 2007) (alert by reliable drug dog is -2- sufficient to establish probable cause for presence of controlled substance; if probable cause justifies search of lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies search of every part of vehicle and its contents that may conceal object of search). In addition, McIntosh was entitled to summary judgment on Sours’s claim related to his arrest on a stolenproperty charge, as it was beyond genuine dispute that, when McIntosh submitted his probable cause statement, he was aware of facts warranting a belief that Sours had possessed stolen property. See United States v. Perry, 908 F.3d 1126, 1129 (8th Cir. 2018) (probable cause exists if facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant person of reasonable caution to believe person to be arrested has committed offense). Sours also asserted a claim that Karr violated his rights by arresting him for violating a City of Duquesne obstruction ordinance. We conclude that the district court did not resolve the issues surrounding that claim with sufficient clarity to allow for effective appellate review.1 See TriMed, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 608 F.3d 1333, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (district court must state its reasons for granting summary judgment when its underlying holdings would otherwise be ambiguous or unascertainable); cf. Robbins v. Becker, 715 F.3d 691, 694 (8th Cir. 2013) (district court must resolve issues surrounding qualified immunity with sufficient clarity to allow for effective appellate review). 1 While we express no opinion as to the merits of this claim, we note that it is unclear whether the obstruction charge remains pending in the municipal court, whether the allegedly obstructive conduct occurred in the City of Duquesne, and whether there was at least arguable probable cause to support the arrest. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393-94 (2007); Tony Alamo Christian Ministries v. Selig, 664 F.3d 1245, 1249 (8th Cir. 2012); see also Hoyland v. McMenomy, 869 F.3d 644, 65258 (8th Cir. 2017); cf. State v. M.L.S., 275 S.W.3d 293, 299 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (interpreting Mo. Rev. Stat. § 576.030). -3- Accordingly, we vacate the grant of summary judgment on Sours’s claim that Karr violated his rights by arresting him for obstruction, remand for further consideration of that claim, and affirm in all other respects. ______________________________ -4-

Primary Holding

The district court's adverse grant of summary judgment in plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against the police chief and law enforcement officers affirmed in part and vacated in part.

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