Deck v. Jennings, No. 17-2055 (8th Cir. 2020)
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The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief to petitioner based on the ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner was convicted for two counts of first degree murder among other things and was sentenced to death. Petitioner claims that counsel at his third penalty-phase trial was ineffective for failing to argue that the passage of time had undermined his mitigation case.
The court held that petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is not "substantial enough" to excuse his procedural default. The court explained that when postconviction counsel filed petitioner's petition in 2010, the law was far from settled that a 10-year delay between conviction and sentencing would give rise to a constitutional claim, much less that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the argument two years earlier. The court stated that failing to make an argument that would require the resolution of unsettled legal questions is generally not outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. In this case, postconviction counsel's performance was reasonable and the Martinez exception—the only conceivable basis for excusing petitioner's procedural default—is unavailable to him. Finally, the court held that petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
Court Description: [Stras, Author, with Smith, Chief Judge, and Colloton, Circuit Judge] Prisoner case - Habeas. Deck was convicted three separate times for the murders of James and Zelma Long and received the death penalty in each prosecution; his first two convictions were reversed and 10 years passed between his first conviction and his third; in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Deck contended that counsel at his third-penalty phase trial was ineffective for failing to argue that the passage of time had undermined his mitigation case, and that postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; the district court granted habeas relief, finding postconviction counsel's failure to raise the issue provided cause for excusing the defaulted ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim under Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012); further, the district court concluded that under Edwards v. Carpenter, 549 U.S. 446 (2000), the newly excused ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim provided cause for the default of the underlying 8th and 14th Amendment claims. Held: Deck did not establish cause for his failure to raise the claim in state court, and the grant of habeas relief is reversed; the law was unsettled at the time of sentencing that a 10-year delay between conviction and sentencing would give rise to a constitutional claim and was no more settled when postconviction counsel filed for postconviction relief in 2010; postconviction counsel could reasonably conclude that raising an unsettled or novel claim would only have detracted from his other, stronger arguments for postconviction relief; his performance was reasonable, and the Martinez exception, the only conceivable basis for excusing Deck's procedural default, was unavailable to him.
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