Johnson v. City of Ferguson, No. 16-1697 (8th Cir. 2019)
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The Eighth Circuit granted defendants' petition for rehearing en banc and vacated the previous opinion.
The court reversed the district court's ruling that plaintiff had alleged sufficient claims to state 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against a police officer, the police chief, and the city. The court held that, in the absence of any intentional acquisition of physical control terminating plaintiff's freedom of movement through means intentionally applied, no seizure occurred. In this case, plaintiff was not ordered to stop and to remain in place, plaintiff's decision to remain with his companion during the companion's altercation with the officer rather than complying with the officer's lawful command to return to the sidewalk was that of his own choosing, and plaintiff was able to leave the scene following the discharge of the officer's weapon gives lie to his argument that the place of the officer's vehicle prevented him from doing so. The court also held that the claim of supervisory liability against the police chief and municipal liability against the city failed because there was no constitutional violation.
Court Description: Wollman, Author, for the Court En Banc] Civil case - Civil rights. For the panel opinion in this matter, see Johnson v. City of Ferguson, 864 F.3d 866 (8th Cir. 2017). Under the facts presented, the defendant police officer, Darren Wilson, did not seize plaintiff. Wilson did not order plaintiff or his companion, Michael Brown, to stop and remain in place; the fact that plaintiff was able to leave the scene following Wilson's discharge of his service weapon at Brown gives lies to his argument that the placement of Wilson's police car prevented him from doing so; any physical or weapon-related contact by Wilson was directed towards Brown alone; because there was no verbal or physical impediment to plaintiff's freedom of movement, there was not submission to authority on his part; accordingly, in the absence of any intentional acquisition of physical control terminating plaintiff's freedom of movement through means intentionally applied, there was no seizure; with respect to the claim of supervisory liability against Ferguson's chief of police, because there was no seizure and no violation of a constitutional right, the claim for supervisor liability against the chief and municipal liability against the City necessarily fail. Judge Melloy, with whom Chief Judge Smith and Circuit Judges Kelly and Erickson join, dissenting.
This opinion or order relates to an opinion or order originally issued on July 25, 2017.
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