Grant v. City of Blytheville, Arkansas, No. 15-2427 (8th Cir. 2016)
Annotate this CasePlaintiff filed suit against the City, alleging violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621-634, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff alleged that he was terminated from his job on account of his race and age after being employed by the City for twenty-seven years. The court affirmed the district court's grant of the City's motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the district court did not err in setting aside the entry of default judgment where the City's delay in filing its answer was excusable and there was no bad faith or intentional effort to delay on the City's part; plaintiff failed to identify no similarly situated employee outside plaintiff's protected class who was treated more favorably by the City, and thus the inference-of-discrimination element of plaintiff's prima facie case has not been established on this basis; plaintiff failed to identify any biased comments made by a decisionmaker that might establish an animus-based inference of discrimination; there has been no showing that the City failed to follow any applicable policy in making the decision to fire plaintiff and no inference of discrimination has been established on this basis; and the City consistently cited insubordination as its reason for firing plaintiff, and thus there is no record-based shifting-reasons basis for an inference of discrimination. Accordingly, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to substantiate his claims of race and age discrimination with sufficient probative evidence to permit a rational trier of fact to find in his favor. The court affirmed the judgment.
Court Description: Wollman, Author, with Melloy and Colloton, Circuit Judges] Civil case - Employment discrimination. The district court did not abuse its discretion by setting aside a default judgment against the City as its delay in filing an answer was excusable and there was no evidence of bad faith or intentional delay on the City's part; plaintiff could identify no similarly situated employee outside of plaintiff's protected class who was treated more favorably by the City, and the inference-of-discrimination element of plaintiff's prima facie case has not been established; nor was there any showing that the City failed to follow any applicable policy in making the decision to fire plaintiff and no inference of discrimination was established on this basis; the City consistently cited plaintiff's insubordination as the reason for its decision to fire him and thus there is no record-based shifting-reasons basis for an inference of discrimination; as there was no prima facie case of age or race discrimination, the City's summary judgment is affirmed.
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