Ortiz v. Lynch, No. 14-2428 (8th Cir. 2015)
Annotate this CaseOrtiz, a native of Mexico, became a lawfully-admitted permanent resident of the U.S. in 2002. In 2006, Ortiz pled guilty to obstruction of legal process—a crime committed when he was 18 years old. Ortiz was sentenced to 1 year in a workhouse—with a 2-year stay on 320 days of the sentence—and a $50.00 fine. More than seven years later, DHS charged Ortiz as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for committing an “aggravated felony” and under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) for committing a crime involving “moral turpitude.” The IJ found Ortiz’s conviction was an “aggravated felony” because it was a “crime of violence.” The BIA upheld the IJ’s determination. The Eighth Circuit vacated. Minnesota precedent plainly shows the words “force or violence,” in the statute under which Ortiz was convicted, encompass a broader scope of conduct than the “physical force” required to be a categorical “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. 16.
Court Description: Bright, Author, with Riley, Chief Judge, and Murphy, Circuit Judge] Petition for Review - Immigration. Because Minnesota's interpretation of the phrase "force or violence" in its obstruction of legal process is broader than the definition of physical force in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 16, a conviction under Minn. Stat. Sec. 609.50, subd. 2(2) is not categorically a crime of violence, and the BIA erred in upholding the IJ's decision that the conviction was categorically a crime of violence requiring petitioner's removal under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); remanded for further proceedings, in particular whether petitioner's conviction subjects him to removal under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) for a crime involving moral turpitude.
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