United States v. Antonio Speed, No. 14-1841 (8th Cir. 2014)
Annotate this CaseCourt Description: Criminal case - Criminal Law. Anders case. The evidence was sufficient to support defendant's felon-in-possesion conviction; challenge to constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g) rejected.
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United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________ No. 14-1841 ___________________________ United States of America lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee v. Antonio Nathaniel Speed lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant ____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis ____________ Submitted: December 17, 2014 Filed: December 22, 2014 [Unpublished] ____________ Before WOLLMAN, BYE, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges. ____________ PER CURIAM. A jury convicted Antonio Speed of one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and the district court1 sentenced him 1 The Honorable Rodney W. Sippel, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri. to 84 months in prison, within the advisory Guidelines imprisonment range of 77-96 months. Speed appeals his conviction and sentence, and his counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). In addition, Speed has filed a supplemental pro se brief. Addressing in turn each of the arguments raised in the briefs, we affirm. We first conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, and resolving evidentiary conflicts in favor of the government, was sufficient to support the guilty verdict. See United States v. Spears, 454 F.3d 830, 832 (8th Cir. 2006) (standard of review). The government adduced evidence that Speed had prior felony convictions, and that a firearm seized during a search of his residence on July 11, 2013, was manufactured outside Missouri. See United States v. Brown, 422 F.3d 689, 691-92 (8th Cir. 2005) (felon-in-possession elements). We also conclude that the 84-month sentence imposed was not unreasonable, see United States v. Wanna, 744 F.3d 584, 589 (8th Cir.) (standard of review), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 125 (2014); and we find no merit to Speed’s challenges to the jurisdiction of the district court over these criminal proceedings, and to the constitutionality of section 922(g), see United States v. White Horse, 316 F.3d 769, 772 (8th Cir. 2003) (subject-matter jurisdiction in every federal criminal prosecution comes from 18 U.S.C. § 3231); United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919, 924-25 (8th Cir.2010) (rejecting Second Amendment challenge); United States v. Hill, 386 F.3d 855, 859 (8th Cir.2004) (rejecting Commerce Clause challenge). Speed’s remaining arguments concerning his lack of access to legal materials and the prosecutor’s closing argument are unpreserved, and are unsupported by a showing of prejudice. Finally, we have reviewed the record independently in accordance with Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988), and have found no nonfrivolous issues. The judgment is affirmed, and counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted. ___________________________ -2-
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