Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co., No. 13-3170 (8th Cir. 2015)
Annotate this CasePlaintiffs brought a putative class action against Union Pacific Railway, and Stickle, alleging that failure to properly build and maintain railway bridges over the Cedar River caused or exacerbated the 2008 flood and that the decision to attempt to stabilize the bridges by weighing them down with railcars filled with ballast caused or exacerbated the flooding of their properties, either because bridges collapsed and effectively dammed the river and blocked drainage, or because railcars on bridges that did not collapse blocked the free flow of the river and diverted water into low-lying areas. Union Pacific filed Notice of Removal that asserted federal question jurisdiction and stated that attorneys for the co-defendants had no objection to removal, accompanied by a local rule certification that: “co-defendants have given their consent to the removal.” Stickle did not file notice of consent to removal until more than 30 days after Union Pacific was served. By that time, Plaintiffs had moved to remand, arguing that their claims were not completely preempted and that not all defendants had timely consented. The district court denied remand. The Eighth Circuit vacated, finding the consent adequate, but that the state claims were not completely preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, 49 U.S.C. 701.
Court Description: Wollman, Author, with Riley, Chief Judge, and Bye, Circuit Judge] Civil case - Torts. In action alleging defendants' actions in failing to properly build and maintain railroad bridges over the Cedar River as well as their actions in weighing the bridges down caused or exacerbated the 2008 flooding in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, the district court did not err in finding the case had been timely removed from state court, as a defendant's timely removal notice indicating consent on behalf of a codefendant, signed and certified pursuant to Rule 11 and followed by the filing of a consent from the codefendant itself, sufficiently established the codefendant's consent to removal; the district court erred in concluding the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, 49 U.S.C. Sections 701-727, completely preempted plaintiffs' state-law claims and in ordering the case transferred to the Surface Transportation Board, for while the Act may completely preempt certain claims, the defendants had failed to established that plaintiffs' claims fell within the scope of those so preempted.
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